GUIDELINES
FOR EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS TRAINING IN
CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training
for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict

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PREFACE

The large number of armed conflicts around the world and their impact constitute a major threat to development and social progress in the world today. Employment promotion and skills training are among the critical efforts required for effective reintegration of the millions of conflict-affected groups. They are also indispensable for reconstruction and sustainable peace building. However, the adverse socio-economic, political, psychological, physical and human consequences of armed conflicts make employment promotion and skills training a complex issue to tackle. Innovative approaches are required that take adequate account of the nature of the context and its challenges. The guidelines contained in this document are an effort to elaborate the required approaches. They have been prepared as a planning and support tool for policy makers, programme planners and implementers and for other relevant actors at the national, regional and international levels.

The document analyses, in a succinct form, some of the key issues to be taken into account and provides specific programme guidelines. In addition, it attempts to spell out the ILO's potential actions. For a more detailed examination of the latter, the reader should consult the *Draft ILO policy statement on conflict-affected countries*, adopted at the ILO Interregional Seminar on Reintegration of Conflict-affected Groups held in Turin from 3 to 7 November 1997, as well as the document *Towards a framework for ILO policy and action in the conflict-affected context* (ILO, 1997). The development and utilization of the guidelines should be a dynamic and flexible process. Adaptation of these general guidelines to specific conflict-affected country contexts and illustration of the issues with concrete examples of relevant programmes and projects in such situations are called for.

We would appreciate receiving feedback from the users of these guidelines to assist the ILO in the process of continually revising them to enhance their relevance. *Such feedback should be transmitted to Eugenia Date-Bah, Training Policies and Systems Branch, ILO, CH-1211, Geneva 22, Switzerland.*

The guidelines form one of the outputs of the ILO action programme on skills and entrepreneurship training for countries emerging from armed conflict, under implementation during the 1996-97 biennium. The Programme's objective was to enhance local, national and international capacity to plan and implement effective reintegration, reconstruction and peace-building programmes. Many country studies and other analyses in the different regions of the world, national and interregional seminars and consultative meetings were undertaken. A number of outputs were produced, some of which can be found in the bibliography and further reading list at the end of this document.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the following to the preparation of the Guidelines: Chris Cramer and John Weeks, external consultants; Eugenia Date-Bah, coordinator of the Action Programme; Jean Gruat; Paulo Barcia, Irma Specht and a number of ILO field and headquarters staff, both within and outside the Action Programme; and many ILO tripartite constituents, especially those who attended the ILO Interregional Seminar in Turin.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document discusses the requirements for employment and skills promotion in conflict-affected countries, focusing on how training and employment programmes should be adapted to this context. The most appropriate mix of tools and methods will depend on the specific circumstances of each conflict-affected country. In such circumstances, there is a particular need for an integrated approach and clearly defined partnerships among a range of actors – local, national and international.

When guidelines are applied to particular situations, they must take account of the origins of a given conflict. Social tensions that contribute to conflicts tend to outlast a formal period of conflict and need to be addressed by programmes of reintegration and recovery. This document strongly emphasizes the need for reintegration programmes to begin with thorough research and analysis of the origins and impact of a specific conflict and the associated pattern of requirements designed to meet the needs of the diverse conflict-affected people. Further, each programme should respond to the manner in which conflict has affected society. The impact of conflict is both direct and indirect. It is manifested in many ways: on combatants, women, the internally and externally displaced, disabled persons, children and refugees. Each group has particular needs. However, the various groups are not exclusive, and their needs should be mainstreamed in programmes, rather than addressed in programmes that segregate the groups.

Institutions are typically weakened by conflicts, and prior institutional weaknesses may also be among the contributing causes of conflict. Institutional weaknesses require and create an opportunity for close collaboration between institutions such as in employment and skills programmes in the conflict-affected countries. The preferred response should be to work with, and simultaneously build up, national and local capacity rather than to bypass the weak local institutions by setting up parallel, externally driven mechanisms for programme delivery.

Workers are made vulnerable by conflict. The public and private capital stock is depleted, and labour encounters constraints on its mobility. Much of the mobility that occurs separates people from social support networks and productive assets and leaves them doubly vulnerable. There is an urgent need for improved governance of labour markets to facilitate the reintegration of refugees/returnees, ex-combatants, war widows, and others into labour markets. Here also there may be a need to reform regulations if they negatively stifle the impact for labour demand.

There is an urgent need for improved labour market information systems in the conflict-affected countries. Information can be accumulated rapidly, using techniques such as the key informant system. This information should be part of a continuous and ongoing exercise. It will, however, be difficult to achieve the objective of employment promotion when macroeconomic conditions are overly restrictive. Macroeconomic policy should take note of the specific economic and social conditions of conflict-affected countries.

Responding to the challenge of conflict-affected populations involves simultaneous implementation of a range of programmes such as : life and peace skills, vocational training, small and micro-enterprise development, labour-intensive infrastructure works and social protection. These must be coordinated to minimize duplication and maximize complemen-

tarities. Such programmes should be directed at communities that contribute to their design and implementation, rather than at special groups. Vocational training and other programmes targeted at ex-combatants can cause perceptions of discriminatory treatment of the other conflict-affected groups and undermine social reintegration. Nevertheless, in some cases there are pragmatic reasons for targeting resources to ex-combatants. At the same time, programmes need to be integrated and dynamic: not only should their component parts relate to one another, but also there should be an ongoing process of information gathering, programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and continual improvements to programme and project design in response to the rapidity of change in the conflict-affected context.

Programmes should maximize participation. Although this may impose costs and delays, it can help to consolidate a lasting social peace, while also facilitating national "ownership" of programmes. The overall approach should be inclusionary, for example, mainstreaming ex-combatants or disabled persons into programmes for the public at large. As well as lessening the likelihood of discrimination, this approach could reduce administrative and monitoring costs.

Infrastructure rehabilitation and extension play a central role in most post-conflict programmes. Infrastructure tends to suffer severely in conflict, while at the same time being critical to the social, economic and political recovery and cohesion of a country. Infrastructure works have great potential to create employment, directly and indirectly. The labour intensity of a given infrastructure rehabilitation scheme can vary and should be evaluated carefully at an early stage. This involves balancing labour absorption against output quality and long-run maintenance costs. There are various institutional systems for the management and implementation of infrastructure works. "Best practice" will vary with local institutional capacities. Programmes should aim to create effective partnerships between state and private sector bodies and to include local communities.

Conflict interrupts skills development for many wage-earning and self-employment activities. It disrupts social and other mechanisms through which people develop social skills. Therefore, a skills and employment crisis usually occurs in conflict-affected countries and is often an intensification of the skills shortage prior to conflict. Furthermore, the skills required may change as a result of destruction of the economic structure and disruptions to family life. There will be a need for a wide variety of training provisions, including life skills. There may be a need both for training programmes specifically designed for demobilized combatants, disabled persons, women and children, as well as for communities. However, the social return to include vulnerable groups in broader programmes is likely to be higher than having programmes that segregate people into different schemes. Where possible, training should be provided in communities rather than in distant training centres. On the whole, a flexible approach and the use of a variety of training providers are advisable.

Vocational skills for self- and wage-employment need urgent development. This is also true for businesses skills, which can quickly contribute to employment growth. Such training should be for both the formal and the informal sectors. Because conflict-affected countries are so diverse in terms of levels of development, business skills training must be flexible and adaptive. Many conflict-affected countries are low income, in which the small and informal enterprises provide a major proportion of employment. Promotion programmes should be linked to patterns of demand for goods and services and in particular should be coordinated with infrastructure availability and rehabilitation.

During the profound social and economic changes created by conflict, a number of successful "conflict entrepreneurs" emerge, with financial assets and experience that can

potentially contribute to peace-time recovery. Depending on political conditions, it may be appropriate to facilitate the transition of these entrepreneurs into peace-time businesses.

This document also highlights how the ILO specifically can contribute to skills formation and employment promotion in conflict-affected countries. The ILO has a particularly strong role to play, in view of its founding mission, the number of its member States that have experienced or are experiencing conflicts, and Recommendation No. 71, Employment (Transition from War to Peace), 1944. Central to the effectiveness of ILO operations is coordination with other actors, in country and external. The ILO should be involved from as early a stage as possible in the conflict-affected contexts to plan and design programmes, some of which can be implemented before conflict ends. A unique and important role of the ILO is the fostering of workplace standards and workers' rights, including those for small and micro businesses, with a view to ensuring an effective labour force in an inclusive society.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and use of the guidelines

1.   The elements of training and employment programmes are well known, accumulated over decades of experience. Less well known, however, is how to adapt them to a conflict-affected context so that they can be implemented effectively. They need to be adjusted to address directly the urgent needs of conflict resolution, reintegration, reconstruction and peace building. *This document attempts to present guidelines* for the planning and implementation of employment promotion and skills training programmes for the reintegration of conflict-affected people into the mainstream of civil society. In a conflict situation, virtually the entire population is affected to some extent. The focus of these guidelines is on those for whom conflict has disrupted their ability to generate livelihoods.[1] The guidelines build on the ILO's experiences, data and insights, especially those gathered in recent years such as through the ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training for Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict (1996-97), International Labour Recommendation No. 71 and other relevant international labour standards, as well as other pertinent information outside the Organization.

2.   *The users* of this document will be national policy makers, planners and implementers from government, employers and workers' organizations, other national bodies and actors in civil society, donors, international agencies, bilateral and multilateral bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the conflict-affected countries to provide them guidance in planning and implementing skills training and employment promotion programmes. In general, the document stresses that these actors should not act alone, but in well-defined partnerships. It is hoped that the document will create an active exchange of views, which will lead to its adaptation to specific contexts and also contribute generally to its improvement.

3.   *The primary purpose* of this document is to provide a planning and programming tool for timely and effective action to implement skills training and livelihood promotion in conflict-affected contexts. To be an effective tool, the guidelines should operationalize skills training and employment creation for the specific circumstances of these contexts. Operationalizing programmes is done with full recognition that each conflict situation is different. Conflict affects a range of economies from the very low income (e.g. Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique) to those that are or have been middle income (e.g. Croatia and Bosnia). It is thus difficult to prepare guidelines that will be equally applicable to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Liberia, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. The challenges facing the social partners and other national actors will differ with regard to the level of development and the structure of the economy, as well as the ethnic composition and other diversities of the population, the origins and impact of the conflict, and other features of the country. Thus, what will be successful or considered "best practice" in one

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1   This document reflects the lessons of a body of individual case study material, as well as more general ILO and other international agency work on conflict-affected countries. The guidelines also reflect the insights generated by the ILO Seminar: *Challenges for skills training and employment promotion in a country emerging from armed conflict*, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (October 1997) and by the ILO *Interregional seminar on reintegration of conflict-affected groups*, held in Turin, Italy (November 1997).

country may be impossible or ineffective in another; what addresses pressing problems in one region of a country may prove irrelevant or even conflict inducing in another. However, this does not prevent identifying general operational principles, but it makes it a formidable task and also sets a limit to them, especially in their level of concreteness and even pertinence. The application of such guidelines thus requires flexibility. Ultimately, all guidelines must be adapted to specific contexts and conditions. Thus, comments from users will be required, especially on how the guidelines can be adapted to specific situations and also how to fine tune them to achieve the appropriate balance between being general and yet pertinent. The elaboration of these guidelines should therefore be seen as "work in progress".

4.   The focus of the guidelines is livelihood promotion and skills training in the conflict-affected context. Livelihood promotion includes both wage, non-wage or self-employment. Training is linked to employment through providing vocational skills, life skills and preparation for employment. This central purpose of the guidelines also serves a political function: to promote policy dialogue among planners, implementers and donors, in order to generate an interactive exchange in which lessons and experiences are transmitted among the actors in the reintegration and rehabilitation process.

5.   It should also be stressed that vocational training and capacity building are essential components of every integrated programme aimed at the employability of the conflict-affected groups, such as through the creation of employment opportunities, self-employment and the development of other remunerative activities. The guidelines presented in this document recognize this, but to provide scope for more detailed examination of vocational training a separate section is allocated to it. Capacity building forms the focus of an ILO training package, entitled *Skills support for capacity building of employment promoters in the conflict-affected contexts.* The training package can be used in conjunction with the guidelines document.

6.   Furthermore, this document can be taken as a guide, within the context of the *Framework for ILO policy and action in the conflict-affected context* (ILO, 1997), on possible ILO input into the overall current United Nations effort to ameliorate the causes and effects of conflict in member States. The key to an effective role within the international system is coordination among the constituent UN agencies, the international financial institutions and other bodies. One aspect of such coordination and of an effective ILO role would be for the ILO's participation at an early stage in peace-making and conflict resolution. During that process, the ILO could provide guidance to insert employment and training as a key component of reintegration, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building programmes. But the ILO – and other UN agencies – must preserve neutrality with regard to conflicting groups and interests within society. The ILO can use its traditional tripartite constituency as the basis for promoting open dialogue and "voice regulation" in support of programmes for conflict-affected countries and also as the foundation for promoting reconciliation.

7.   Many of the programmes or options for action on livelihoods are relevant for non-conflict situations. However, in a conflict-affected country, there are special problems of design and implementation which do not present themselves in normal conditions. Especially important is the reconstruction of society to meet the needs of the population, which involves, among other things, rehabilitating physical infrastructure, re-establishing the administrative capacity of government and other relevant institutions, and achieving reconciliation of previously antagonistic groups. Part of this process is the reintegration of people into the reconstituted social frame-

work. For ex-combatants and displaced persons, this reintegration is also in part a physical relocation. For all conflict-affected groups, it is a process of generating livelihoods and overcoming the traumas of violence.

8.   This document does not consider in detail the causes of conflict, nor the analytical framework on which reconstruction and reintegration are based, since this information is provided elsewhere.[2] The causes of conflict are varied and particular and cannot be neatly captured at the level of a general guidelines document. Nevertheless, these guidelines make it clear that all specific programmes must begin with analysis and understanding of the causes of conflict and their implications.

9.   Conflict disrupts the development process. Central to reconstruction and reintegration is providing a link from emergency to rehabilitation and also to the re-initiation of the development process of the conflict-affected country. The guidelines are, therefore, written to incorporate this transition from the outset of reintegration and reconstruction operations.

10.   Each conflict has its specific causes, unique solution, and concrete aspects of devastation. Few guidelines can be applied without adaptation to all situations. In each country or region of a country, therefore, the relevant actors must assess the appropriateness of each area of the guidelines. This implies that the concept of "best practice" needs to be interpreted flexibly, so that the particular circumstances of each situation rule decision making.

11.   However, experience in different countries can provide a guide to general planning. Discussion of the guidelines by practitioners can help to develop the appropriate flexibility. Thus, the guidelines presented are not written in stone, but form part of an interactive process in which the accumulated knowledge of the various actors is synthesized through discussion and debate.

12.   The guidelines put heavy stress on cooperation and division of labour. The reintegration process, designed to facilitate development with an equitable peace, requires the support of all major national, regional and international actors in an inclusive programme of national reconstruction. Coordination is essential among these internal as well as external actors. It is also vitally important to develop institutional capacity and a range of well-defined institutional partnerships between the various actors in the conflict-affected country. This will help to mobilize most effectively the available administrative resources and sources of information and to enable programmes and projects to be carried out within an integrated framework for greater synergy and impact, as well as to better reflect the fullest spread of interests and needs.

13.   More detailed sector- and subject-specific ILO guidelines, such as *Women and gender issues relevant for skills training, Employment promotion in the conflict-affected context, The trade unions in conflict-affected countries* and *The reintegration of demobilized combatants through training and employment* are available and can be used to supplement the general guidelines contained in this document.

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2   These are developed in C. Crammer and J. Weeks: *Analytical foundations for skills training and employment promotion programmes* (Geneva, ILO, Dec. 1997).

1.2 Glossary of relevant terms

14.   There is no model of conflict common to all situations. However, the planning and implementation of actions in conflict-affected countries is facilitated by the use of key terms. Defining these terms helps to clarify the relationship between the guidelines and the problems they seek to address.

n   *Emergency* refers to that period of a conflict during which there is active armed conflict and/or extreme human suffering, such as famine, arising from that conflict.

n   *Rehabilitation* involves immediate post-war measures to achieve minimum functioning of the transport and communications infrastructure, shelter, and public administration. Rehabilitation measures normally have a short implementation period.

n   *Reconstruction* is the first step in initiating the development process and involves repair and expansion of physical facilities, as well as enhancing administrative capacity in the public and private sectors (including NGOs). Rehabilitation and reconstruction are difficult to separate in practice.

n   *Development operations* are long term, continuing the task of reconstruction but also initiating new programmes to increase physical, human, and social capital.

n   *Reintegration* is the general process of reabsorbing the populations affected by conflict into civil society.

n   *Reconciliation* is the process of progressively eliminating the tensions and animosities that generated conflict.

n   *Targeting* is the identification of people according to pre-set characteristics: ex-combatants, refugees, internally displaced, women, child soldiers, disabled persons, etc. The purpose of targeting is to exclude non-targeted people, in principle on objective and fair criteria.

2. CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: MAJOR ISSUES

15. The design and implementation of relevant skills training and livelihood promotion programmes in the conflict-affected countries have, inter alia, to take into account the nature of this context, the conflict-affected groups, and the appropriate framework for designing and implementing reintegration programmes .

16. In doing this, it should be borne in mind that the **fundamental purpose of reintegration programmes is to contribute to building sustainable peace, a return to civil life and improved material and other conditions of the people**. The goal of each actor in the process – local, national or international – should there-fore be to contribute to that end. Conflicts can end without being resolved. If so, they may reoccur and thus destroy peace. The process of conflict resolution and peace building seeks, on the one hand, to eliminate certain perceptions, beliefs, and prejudices. On the other hand, it constructs a set of perceptions, beliefs, and positive prejudices that are inconsistent with a return to violence. Implementing the elements of a reintegration programme is in great part technical and managerial. Effective implementation is one of the building blocks in the construction of the edifice of conflict resolution and peace building.

2.1 The conflict-affected context

17.   Conflict is a complex process with diverse causes and no general and fixed "life cycle". Review of actual conflicts indicates that most do not conform to the three-fold division: peace, conflict and settlement. Attempts to divide the conflict-affected situation into these phases must inevitably be subjective. Even the dichotomy between conflict and peace can be a misleading simplification. Many countries that suffer from armed conflict do so after an extended period of low-level or regionalized violence. The transition from "peace" to "war" is, therefore, a matter of degree and interpretation. Open armed conflicts often emerge after a long-established pattern of heightened and intermittent violence or forms of armed criminality. Continuation or, in some cases, an increase of the latter also tends to affect stability after conflict. Furthermore, formal peace accords are frequently followed by a continuation of armed struggles, which wax and wane. With few exceptions, the related processes of reconciliation and reintegration occur in the context of intermittent violence and insecurity. This adds to the difficulty of defining "peace" precisely. Implementing programmatic responses to conflict situations occurs in the context of waning conflict, rather than in the context of "peace" as a fixed, achieved state. A major purpose of these responses is to facilitate the process of building or enhancing peace. If their implementation is dependent upon the prior achievement of a steady state of peace in the strict sense, they will be severely limited in scope and extent. Furthermore, there is considerable diversity between conflicts in their duration. In addition, some engulf the whole country, while others are localized in only some parts of the country. The scale of the impact of conflicts thus tends to differ. Therefore, every guideline for action has its origin and its application in the concrete circumstances of each conflict.

Causes of conflicts

18.   Conflicts arise from a variety of causes: ethnic tensions, a struggle for independence, social exclusion and inequality, poverty, competition for scarce resources, religious differences, oppression and authoritarianism, and other political, economic, social and human rights factors. Programmes to facilitate reintegration should be designed and their feasibility assessed with an understanding of these causes. No programme can achieve success without specifically taking account of the origins of conflict and the form taken by social tension (Baden, 1997, p. 81).

19.   Labour and other economic factors are rarely the sole cause of conflicts. However, they can intensify tensions and accelerate the outbreak of armed conflict. Poverty, high levels of unemployment and inequalities of income and wealth distribution can be a major source of tension, more so when they change rapidly, because stable distribution may be accepted as part of the "normal" operation of society. Changes in income and wealth inequalities result in changes in relative power in society, which affects access to resources. When access by people is restricted, competition over resources can take socially dysfunctional forms, especially if those whose access is restricted perceive themselves as having a corporate or communal identity. A major purpose of programmes of reintegration is to reduce perceived and actual inequities in the competition over limited resources.

20.   In some cases, competition over land can be a major contributory factor to conflict. This competition can intensify during the transition to peace, because during armed conflict the general disruption of social life can produce conflicting claims on land. For this reason, arriving quickly at a

settlement of the land question is essential to prevent the rekindling of conflict. Resolution of the land question can itself be a cause of conflicts and, therefore, must be managed carefully, with the participation of contending agents and groups. Resolution can, but need not in all cases, involve land redistribution. The less radical measure, land titling, can be equally contentious if multiple claims on land are widespread.

21. While not usually autonomous causes of conflict, environmental debasement and population pressure can increase competition over resources. In some cases, this can provoke a sense of desperation in populations that transforms tension into armed struggle. In many cases, environmental degradation and increased population-land ratios can be counteracted by investment and application of different technologies (Karshenas, 1991). However, in very poor countries, as in sub-Saharan Africa, the public sector may lack the resources to introduce resource-enhancing measures. Thus, the general level of development, environmental pressures, and population growth combine to create situations vulnerable to conflict.

Impact of conflicts

22. The impact of armed conflicts is on the whole negative, but there can also be some positive impact such as gender role changes and democracy. First and foremost, conflicts result in human suffering and death. The human losses outweigh economic costs. The primary reason for ending conflicts is to reduce human suffering. This effect of war cannot be reconstructed, though rehabilitation of survivors must be part of any programme of reintegration.

23. Physical damage, for example to workplaces and infrastructure, can be costly. There are also other direct and indirect costs of conflict. The direct costs include damage to social and economic infrastructure, the physical capital stock, interruption of trading networks and destruction of crops. Indirect costs are inflation (perhaps caused by government borrowing to fund the war effort), rising external indebtedness, the diversion of labour into military activities, and the decline of private-sector investment due to political instability and direct economic costs. In many cases, indirect costs may exceed direct costs, though the former are difficult to measure with precision. The costs of conflict may continue to affect an economy long after a formal peace accord (Stewart, 1993).

24. It is sometimes difficult to assess with any accuracy the costs of conflict on variables such as export earnings, inflation or investment. Indirect costs are often increased by non-conflict factors, including government policy. In some cases, government policy might have actually contributed to causing conflict and be the origin of many of the indirect costs.

25. Among the positive effects of conflict can be the establishment of a democratic government with the previously excluded social groups also represented in it. Furthermore, the very strict gender role divisions may break down owing to the experiences during conflict when women are forced by the exigencies of the situation to assume the so-called "male roles" to ensure the survival of their families and other dependants. **Reintegration programmes should try to sustain these positive changes and to build upon them.**

Institutional weakness

26. A characteristic of conflict-affected countries is the breakdown of govrnance and other forms of institutional weakness. The document *Towards a framework for ILO policy and action in the conflict-affected context* (ILO, 1997)

observes:

> "Among the many factors which should be taken into account [in a conflict-affected situation] are ...
> • distrust and suspicion among the political factions and parties to the conflict...
> • unstable social situation and insufficient social cohesion...
> • weak administrative and institutional structures...[and] limited capacity for employment creation and for social services under ... economic reform programmes." (ILO, August 1997, p. 4)

27.   The report of the ILO seminar *Challenges for skills training and employment promotion in a country emerging from armed conflict*, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (ILO, October 1997, p. 4) also notes that among the characteristics of conflict-affected countries are: "weak capacity of social institutions, insecure environments, displacement of large numbers of people, returnees, ex/combatants to be demobilized, destroyed infrastructure, landmines littered on farm lands and other relevant sites, distrust, higher levels of social deprivation and poverty, and breakdown of social services and community support structures".

28.   If institutions were not weak prior to the conflict, it is in the nature of conflicts that they become so as violence and uncertainty spread. The weakening results from the out-migration of trained people, disruption of settlement patterns, and the loss of authority by the government (in extreme cases, there may be no government in place). The reconciliation process typically begins in a situation in which the institutional capacity to implement programmes is quite limited.

29.   There are basically two strategies for implementing programmes in such a context of diminished institutional capacity. One is to build up programmes outside the national institutional framework in a bid to maximize implementation, efficiency and speed. The other is to focus a significant part of the programme directly on building and reinforcing national and local institutional capacity, in order to implement reintegration programmes through domestic institutions. The second strategy is clearly the more sustainable and, hence, preferable approach. It has the added advantage of making it more likely that programmes can pick up on locally expressed needs, feeding into a programme whose design and implementation have a higher degree of local and national "ownership" and decision-making that can contribute to sustainability of the programmes. Therefore, high priority must be given early on (i.e. even during the emergency phase) to capacity building of local institutions.

30.   The weakness of institutions in conflict-affected countries also requires that programmes be implemented with imaginative use of partnerships. Particularly productive would be partnerships involving local and international NGOs. An additional source of partnerships is community participation, based upon organizations of conflict-affected people and associations arising spontaneously from the community in response to concrete needs.

Labour force consequences

31.   Reintegration programmes occur when the public and private capital stock has been dramatically depleted and when the utilization of the remaining capital stock is reduced by damage to the supporting physical and social infrastructure. The partial destruction of the capital stock of a country strengthens the relative bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis labour by increasing the supply of labour relative to capital. Thus, conflict situations are typically characterized by an increase in the vulnerability of wage and non-wage workers. This vulnerability can take several forms:

n   inability of labour to resist wage decreases;

- deterioration of working conditions that threatens health and safety;

- suppression of workers' rights, including the right to organize collectively; and

- destruction or loss of productive assets of rural and urban informal sector workers, such as farm lands, work shelters and other properties.

32. Vulnerability results from other factors. Both capital and labour are mobile, but labour's mobility is different from that of other commodities. Workers are enmeshed within communities and families, which limits their mobility in practice. This relative immobility of labour weakens its bargaining position vis-à-vis employers. This is intensified if conflict provokes capital flight.

33. A requirement for normalizing the labour market in conflict-affected countries is the reintegration of displaced people, returnees/refugees and ex-combatants into communities, which lays the basis for reducing the vulnerability of workers. Normalization further requires re-establishing labour market governance. ILO conventions on the protection of migrant workers provide useful and relevant guidelines for governance, for many of the issues and problems are similar (ILO, April 1997, pp. 5-7). Labour markets in conflict-affected countries are excessively flexible, to the point of being chaotic. The absence of regulations creates the potential for inequitable employment practices. Application of international labour standards can protect workers and socially conscious employers.

Diversity and profiles of conflict-affected groups

34. Conflict is a social phenomenon in which the entire population of a country is affected. To some degree, everyone in society must be a part of the reconstruction and reconciliation exercise. All countries have diverse populations, with interests and needs varying according to age, gender, religion, culture, social class, region and ethnicity. Planning social and economic programmes for peace building must take into account this diversity before as well as after conflict. Conflict-affected countries also have conflict-specific diversity which cuts across peace-time diversities. Conflict-specific diversity results from the concrete manner in which conflict affects people. Recognizing this diversity is a prerequisite of effective programme design and implementation, because conflict-specific diversity corresponds to a diversity of needs during and after a conflict. Important conflict-affected groups are ex-combatants, the injured and disabled persons, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Within each of these broad categories there is further diversity. Among combatants, for example, there are adult males and females, youth, child soldiers and orphans. Each group has specific problems that programmes ideally should address. In brief, both the diversity before and after conflict should be taken into account.

35. Gender and age diversity should also be considered for all categories of conflict-affected people. **Women** often suffer the effects of conflict in a variety of ways: through loss of family members, through flight from conflict zones; through direct sexual violations as part of the violence of conflict. Actually, in some conflicts women can even benefit from a change in traditionally ascribed gender roles and division of labour; this must be recognized in programme planning.

36. When using these categories to plan and implement programmes, it should be recognized that they are not exclusive; a person or family can fall into more than one category, such as being injured and displaced. Therefore, analytical use of these categories does not necessarily imply specific programmes for each group. While these categories are useful, they are socially

defined in each context. They should not be treated as having a common definition across countries. Further, their use in each situation must be appropriate in order to avoid aggravating the tensions which reintegration programmes seek to reduce (see Baden, 1997, pp. xxi-xxii). To avoid segregating groups with special needs from the general process of reintegration, they can in many cases be mainstreamed into training and employment programmes.

37. **Demobilized soldiers** represent a group whose particular role in society must be accommodated. Inherent in the peace process is the reduction of the size of the military. In practice, some form of demobilization and reintegration occurs, with or without government planning and support. However, demobilized soldiers are not the only group whose situation changes fundamentally during the transition from war to peace. Refugees also require a form of "demobilization", especially those resident, perhaps against their will, in camps. To the extent that demobilization and reintegration of soldiers also involves aid to disabled soldiers other disabled people who were not soldiers should also be considered (see Medi, 1997a & 1997b). There are political reasons for targeting programmes to combatants, if they represent a threat of violence and crime in the absence of effective reintegration into civilian life. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to place first priority on pragmatic considerations rather than equity of treatment across groups. Political imperatives have to be respected. However, the political pressure to focus programmes on demobilized soldiers will not be the same in all countries and circumstances, and greater space for more inclusive programmes for conflict-affected populations may open up over time, once immediate objectives of demobilization have been secured.

38. The goal is that combatants become *ex*-combatants and reintegrate into society as *civilians*. This process is fraught with practical concrete problems of implementation. In many situations, the distinction between combatants and civilians is not clear for some or all parties to the conflict. For a government in power, the making of warfare is not restricted to the military, but also includes the police, security forces, and explicitly or implicitly sanctioned irregular forces and militias. On the side of the insurrectionists, the degree of formality of the combatants varies from well-trained soldiers to part-time fighters who melt into communities when not engaged in their belligerent activities.

39. This ambiguity between combatants and civilians results in an unavoidably ad hoc approach to identifying who was or was not a combatant. In itself, this need not create implementation difficulties. Practical problems arise when reintegration programmes target ex-combatants for programme-specific benefits. To implement such targeting, a definitive identification of an exclusionary nature is required. This process of identification can prove contentious and is vulnerable to political manipulation, especially if the representatives of one side of the conflict take the major role in identification.

40. As already noted above, some people gain from war – for example, in provisioning the military or from undertaking commercial and physical risks (in transport, for example) that most would not countenance. These people do not represent a vulnerable group, but may have a commercial or entrepreneurial role to play when peace is established. Their commercial and entrepreneurial skills could be drawn upon in the implementation of employment and skills programmes. This is a highly sensitive and often political issue. In some countries, these "conflict entrepreneurs" are associated with war-time criminality, corruption, etc. Where this is the case, it is unlikely that such people can be drawn into a reintegration programme. No general guideline can do more than suggest that this is one among the many issues that are specific to each conflict and that must be researched and analysed to

provide a basis for effective programme design.

2.2 General framework for design and implementation of reintegration programmes

41.　　The reintegration process involves the simultaneous implementation of a range of programmes such as life skills, vocational training, labour-intensive works, small- and micro-enterprise promotion and macroeconomic initiatives, to list the most obvious. The conception and implementation of reintegration programmes is often dictated by the **contents of the peace agreement as well as the pace and phasing of the peace process**. The contents of the peace agreement can generally determine the strategies, modalities and timetable as well as the support for skills training and employment promotion programmes within reintegration, and reconstruction and peace-building processes. The operating environment for different actors – both national and external organizations – thus depends partly on the resources invested in the development of a final peace agreement. Where such an agreement is formulated and agreed upon rapidly, its principles and implications may not be widely shared by people "on the ground". Again, these circumstances are likely to sharpen the tension between the urgency of implementing reintegration programmes and the need to make programmes appropriate sustainable. Programme designers, national and external, need to be fully aware of these issues if they are to put together genuinely effective programmes.

42.　　Furthermore, programmes, nationally funded or with external support, usu-ally require a functioning government which has at least the tacit support of all parties to the conflict. This condition, however, does not often exist in the conflict-affected context, and yet programmes have to be pursued. Closely related to this, implementation requires that the actors have adequate security from violence. This need not require a complete end to hostilities, as this is rarely possible in the conflict-affected context.

An integrated approach

43.　　It is extremely important that the various components and phases of reintegration programmes with a focus on skills training and employment promotion for conflict-affected populations are integrated. This obviously increases their efficiency and scope for continuous learning and improvement. It also increases the scope for the effective coordination among international and national (including local) organizations, as examined above. To this end, it is possible to see the programme guidelines in Chapter 3 **not** as discrete project packages but a logical framework for such an integrated programme.

Local ownership, participation and sustainability

44.　　Institutional weakness in conflict-affected countries contributes to the tendency for reintegration programmes to be led by external actors, especially donors. As far as possible, this should be avoided. The reality, of course, is that this is never entirely possible, given the institutional dynamics of large international agencies. But a general guideline is that programmes ought to be designed with this tension in mind; this might mitigate the tendency for frustration with institutional weakness to lead rapidly to the sacrifice of goals of

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      ▲                                              │ ASSESSMENT                  │
      ┆  Design                                      │ ● conflict analysis         │
      ┆                              ┌─────────────► │ ● profile of group          │
      ┆                              │               │ ● macroeconomic environment │
      ┆                              │               │ ● labour market survey      │
      ┆                              │               └─────────────────────────────┘
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      ┆                    │ INSTITUTIONAL   │       │ SELF- AND WAGE              │
      ┆  Implementation    │ CAPACITY BUILDING│──►   │ EMPLOYMENT                  │
      ┆                    │ AND NETWORKING  │       │ ● training                  │
      ┆                    └─────────────────┘       │ ● credit                    │
      ┆                              │               │ ● mix of components         │
      ┆                              │               └─────────────────────────────┘
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         Evaluation                  │               │ MONITORING AND              │
         &                           └─────────────► │ INFORMATION SYSTEM          │
         feedback ◄─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─  │ including labour market     │
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
Diagram

"ownership" and sustainability. The best role for external actors is a facilitating role; even mediation by external actors, valuable as it may be, runs the risk of distorting the peace process.

45.   From the outset, programmes must be "owned" by national actors, with external actors disciplining themselves in line with an advisory or facilitating role. When governments are weak, national ownership can be facilitated through participation of other national and local bodies, something that is stressed repeatedly in these guidelines. Participation, by communities and interest groups, is both the vehicle for national ownership and a bulwark against losing it. If there is active participation by conflict-affected groups, national ownership will follow. The difficulty to watch for here is that the larger the agency involved, the more difficult it tends to be to engage the community genuinely; even local-level NGOs, which may be better equipped to promote participation, on close inspection are not often fully participatory in their approaches. Programmes need to be alert to the difficulties in realiz-

ing participation and to the need to encourage mechanisms that can help in relaxing the specific constraints on participation and national ownership of programmes.

46.   Community participation prevents an inconsistency between the perception of needs at the central level and actual needs of communities. However, in conflict-affected communities it may prove difficult to achieve effective representation of all interests. When animosities persist to the point of preventing a community consensus, it is necessary to seek modes of mediation, which could be provided by government at different levels, NGOs, or other agents of civil society. Where no consensus can be reached, implementation can be postponed, in the hope that project success in consensual communities will prompt conflict resolution in other communities.

47.   External actors, such as donors, can facilitate national ownership by not setting preconceived rules for efficiency, not stressing "best practice" out of context,

and not applying foreign "models" of conflict resolution which will result in external actors taking *de facto* ownership. Each conflict-affected country is a new territory which can be explored better with national actors. Genuine "ownership" may be an ideal that cannot be fully realized but can still be aimed at.

48.   When lack of consensus at the local level blocks implementation, planners at a higher level can design programmes to minimize the tensions they generate. This can be achieved by designing programmes to benefit entire communities, rather than target groups. For example, general literacy or skills training open to all may prove locally acceptable and effective, while vocational training for ex-combatants would prompt perceptions of discriminatory treatment.

49.   An important, but sometimes under-emphasized, aspect of participation is debate over post-conflict economic policy. Arriving at the appropriate economic policy (discussed later in this chapter) is not a purely technical exercise. Governments have a responsibility to inform and consult with their populations in the formulation of economic policy. External funders have the responsibility to encourage debate, which both educates the population and links adjustment to local needs and conditions.

An inclusionary approach

50.   A participatory approach implies that reintegration programmes are inclusive, perhaps in most cases aimed at communities rather than specific groups. An inclusionary approach could be key to the process of creating the perception that peace will be built upon the general welfare and social justice.

51.   An inclusionary process must make cautious use of targeting as a method for rationing benefits. Targeting is by intent exclusionary, even when planners design what they consider to be objective criteria. Where possible, governments and other actors should avoid use of targeting, since it can easily be interpreted by non-beneficiaries as discriminatory and based on political criteria.

52.   The question of whether or not to target groups becomes particularly sensitive for programmes for combatants which involve demobilization as a first step and subsequent reintegration. The first is essential for the transition to peace, and its success can be complicated by benefit targeting in reintegration programmes. Creating programmes targeted to ex-combatants feeds back into the demobilization phase, because strict targeting requires prior strict identification. Strict identification can delay the demobilization process and within the subsequent reintegration programme can generate perceptions of inequitable preferential treatment. Finally, the identification process by its nature cannot be completely transparent, due to its inherent ambiguities and due to the confidentiality of information on individuals. Nevertheless, as stressed earlier, reconciliation and reintegration programmes must respect political imperatives, and these may often prioritize some element of targeting for ex-combatants. The issue should at least be discussed as far as possible, in order to clarify the objectives and issues. In other words, it should not be assumed that, because the question of demobilization of ex-combatants is a political question, therefore necessarily political parties and representatives have no interest in the technical and broader issues of inclusionary versus exclusionary approaches.

53.   To avoid complicating the demobilization process and undermining popular support for the reintegration programme, targeting can be minimized, used only when it would be perceived as appropriate. Reintegration programmes aimed at ex-combatants might be seen by the rest of the population as a rewarding mechanism

for this group. Concretely, therefore, ex-combatants should be mainstreamed into programmes for the public at large: programmes targeted for all those injured or traumatized, civilians or ex-combatants; skills training and employment schemes that are inclusive; and support for micro and small enterprises which is independent of the role played by beneficiaries during the conflict. In this context, programmes for ex-combatants can distinguish between demobilization payments and reintegration payments. The former provide an incentive for soldiers to demobilize and cover the immediate cost of returning to civilian life. Ex-combatants as a special group need not receive targeted reintegration payments; rather, they can acquire reintegration benefits as individual participants in programmes for all conflict-affected people.

54.   Such an inclusionary approach would greatly reduce administrative and monitoring costs. It would also facilitate administration by local actors, who would not be placed in the position of allocating benefits on the basis of previous political roles of applicants. The inclusionary approach would target communities, which is consistent with the general goal of reconstructing civil society. Community targeting has the added advantage of being transparent: if, on publicly accessible criteria, some communities gain disproportionately to their needs, it will be clear for all to see.

55.   An inclusionary, community-focused approach would facilitate broad-based participation and integrate special interest groups (e.g., representing ex-combatants) into a broader political discussion which is concerned with collective responses to conflict-created needs. This approach might reduce interest group competition over benefits or, at the least, direct competition along lines of collective interests.

56.   An inclusionary approach to training and employment, which is delivered to communities, facilitates mainstreaming vulnerable groups into the reintegration process. This is especially important for women, who run the risk of being segregated into special projects that reinforce gender segregation and stereotyped economic and social roles. Other groups, such as the long-term unemployed, (ex-)prisoners and the police in the conflict-affected countries, where this force is over-represented, need also to be included in employment promotion programmes to support political stability.

Economic structures and reintegration programmes

57.   The design and delivery of programmes is affected by the structure of the economy, especially its rural-urban division, and the importance of formal employment relatively to informal employment. These divisions are closely correlated with the level of development. In a relatively developed country, e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, programmes would tend to focus on the urban sector and wage employment (Howell, 1997). In very low-income countries, emphasis would be on the rural sector and self-employment. These differences have major implications for post-conflict tensions and the process of economic inclusion and reconstruction. For example, in a low-income country where the majority of the labour force is in agriculture, a major source of tension in the post-conflict context may arise over the distribution of land. For a more-developed country, social peace may require emphasis upon legislation to guarantee the rights of workers to organize collectively.

Macroeconomic conditions

58.   Conflict is associated with macroeconomic instability: high inflation, growing indebtedness, and an unsustainable balance of payments due to a decline in exports. For reconciliation and reintegration to be successful, macroeconomic imbalances require prompt correction. In many cases, this will only be achieved without great social cost by external assistance, much of it as balance of payment support. Stabilization experience in non-conflict countries does not necessarily provide a guide for policies in conflict-affected countries. At the end of a conflict, there is typically excess capacity, which can in itself reduce the link between fiscal deficits and inflation. To a great extent, inflation may be the result of a lack of credibility of government policy, rather than strictly economic factors.

59.   Given the conditions in conflict-affected countries, external assistance for macroeconomic stability should be extended on flexible terms. Orthodox stabilization tends to stress reduction in fiscal deficits and strict credit limits for the economy. These measures should be tempered by their possible economic costs and their effects on the various conflict-affected groups. All efforts should be made to realize a "peace dividend" – that is, a transfer of public expenditure from military consumption to social programmes. The greater the coordination between the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and other external actors such as UN bodies, including the ILO, at the point of designing economic reform packages, the greater will be the prospects for economic adjustment that is sensitive to the particular needs of conflict-affected countries and does not worsen their economic deprivation and poverty.

60.   If post-conflict macroeconomic policy and employment promotion are consistent, then the reintegration of conflict-affected groups will be achieved more smoothly. On the other hand, success in generating employment and livelihoods will flounder if macroeconomic policies are framed with the sole purpose of stabilization. In conflict-affected countries, stabilization may not be a precondition for reviving growth. If policy is too restrictive, it can generate competition over scarce access to livelihoods and rekindle conflict. In light of this possibility, the World Bank, for example, stresses the social impact of conditionality as part of its planning for operations assessment in conflict-affected countries (World Bank, 1997).

61.   Experience shows that there is frequently a contrast between the processes that produce political settlement of a conflict and the subsequent economic programme. The political settlement is typically public with external actors playing a role as mediators. Due to the public nature of the peace settlement, open debate occurs, even if some national actors would prefer otherwise. In contrast, post-conflict adjustment programmes, even when they are externally funded, are not usually characterized by transparency, public participation and debate. In the usual case, adjustment programmes are agreed between governments and funders, then presented to the population as a *fait accompli*. Thus, an important element of participation, which is debate over post-conflict economic policy, remains under-emphasized.

62.   It should be recognized that arriving at appropriate economic policy is not a purely technical exercise. Governments have a responsibility to inform and consult with their populations in the formulation of economic policy. External funders have the responsibility to encourage debate, which both educates the population and links adjustment to local needs and conditions. Sustainable peace and democratization would be facilitated by a more public and transparent process of determining economic policy. This may enable national and international actors to maximize the complementarities between economic policy and peace-building objectives, as opposed to heightening the possible ten-

sions between the two.

63.   It is also important to note that a particular opportunity and constraint is provided by the nature of employment and the labour market in conflict-affected countries. Given the disruption to formal-sector activities, it is common in such countries that the informal and self-employment sectors will have a dominant role in absorbing the labour force. Programmes will have to acknowledge this and focus a significant part of their attention on informal and self-employment activities. At the same time, the very nature of informal-sector activities makes it difficult to cover them with formal labour standards and regulations; however, programmes may build awareness of such standards into their interventions.

Information requirements

64.   Planning for skills training and livelihoods is required even prior to the peace agreement and the cessation of conflict. Such planning requires **labour market information** and also information on the **profiles, needs, skills, income-generating activities, existing strengths and expectations of all the diverse conflict-affected people**. Thus, early in the reintegration process or even prior to the peace settlement, a system of rapid data collection is required. Background studies can be carried out in anticipation of more stable political conditions. On the basis of the background studies, labour market governance and other programmes can be planned. These two concrete pro-active steps put in place programme designs ready for implementation once conditions allow. Rapid response to emergency needs requires that these steps be taken prior to formalizing peace.

65.   The information on labour markets and skills collected should cover both the past and the present. Information on the past indicates the potential for mobi-

lizing skills for the peace effort, especially the possibility of attracting back trained people who have migrated to other countries. At the same time, current information is key, because conflict is a disruptive process. The conflict-disrupted labour market will be substantially different from that in the past, and it may be impossible to re-establish the *ante-bellum* conditions.

66.   Information on some elements of the conflict-affected groups' profiles is currently collected by some institutions, such as the UNHCR and some NGOs. Since the scope of such information does not cover the whole range of the groups' profiles, especially those necessary for planning and implementing skills training and employment promotion programmes, cooperation between the relevant agencies and institutions, such as between the ILO and the UNHCR, in this sphere could ensure that this draw-back is remedied.

67.   When gathering information on labour markets and profiles, realism is required. Domestic and international actors should not expect or require a quality or quantity of data greater than could have been collected for similar activities were the country at peace. As a corollary, reintegration activities in conflict-affected countries should not be postponed by impractical information requirements, especially when the activities and programmes involved are supported by an accumulation of field experience in the country in question and other countries. Collecting information has direct costs, which should be weighed against the benefits it would bring. There are also indirect costs of data gathering, such as delaying a programme or a project for lack of information.

68.   In most cases, actors implementing programmes will have previously carried out similar projects in the same countries or dealt with similar problems (demobilization would be a major exception). This concrete experience can be mobilized

through trade unions, community organizations, NGOs, and the organizations used as implementing vehicles. Early on, government could initiate a "reconciliation dialogue", which would be the basis for popular participation and involvement of civil society groups into project design and implementation. This would be convened at national, provincial and local levels, thus integrating reconciliation with programme implementation. It would also provide identification and mobilization of local expertise and thus play an information-gathering function.

69.   A system of collecting feedback information needs to be integrated into the design and implementation of the programmes. Feedback and follow-up of the beneficiaries of the reintegration programmes are essential to tackle unforeseen and other implementation problems which they may encounter and also to introduce adjustments to enhance impact and efficacy of the programmes.

70.   Vocational counselling of the target groups/beneficiaries of the reintegration programmes is critical.

Partnerships between different actors and linkages between programmes

71.   Coordination among implementing agencies is essential to avoid duplication of programmes and to enhance synergy and impact of the diverse programmes. The programmes can reinforce each other; e.g., teaching literacy will facilitate vocational training, and employment-intensive works programmes will provide income to support family members in training programmes. Coordination is critical at different levels. Firstly, there is considerable evidence of international support to conflict-affected countries involving a plethora of uncoordinated, sometimes contradictory,

programmes and projects. Apart from the wastage involved, this problem increases the likelihood of external actors competing to impose their own preferred abstract "model" and to over-ride local needs. Thus, greater international coordination can help to improve "voice regulation" to allow for national influence over the programme. Furthermore, international coordination from the earliest possible moment is more likely to minimize the risk of over-stretching already weak institutional and administrative local capacity.

72.   Secondly, coordination among national bodies is critical. This can build on the tripartite constituency of the ILO, but will need to include other relevant local actors (beyond the ILO's constituents), especially the voluntary sector such as associations of groups of conflict-affected people and other local and international NGOs. Developing closer working relationships with NGOs as strategic partners in the implementation of such programmes is particularly necessary in the conflict-affected context, owing to the degree of physical presence and the role of the voluntary sector in such a context and the non-existence or weakness of relevant governmental institutions.

73.   There may also be situations in which local partnership rather than central state bodies is a far more effective channel for reconciliation and reintegration programmes. The state or nation can be perceived as at the very core of the problem, but more localized initiatives can circumvent large, state-level divisions. For example, the district partnerships in Northern Ireland have been a successful institutional innovation, building on existing institutions at the local level, for channelling European Commission funding as part of the EC's Peace and Reconciliation Programme. District partnership boards have been set up, comprising representatives of district councils, the voluntary sector, employers' organizations and trade unions; the boards select projects and pur-

sue EC approval. Arguably, the process of bringing people together at the local level contributes to improving the potential for a national-level peace agreement to adhere. This example serves to highlight the potential for programmes that contribute to reconciliation before the formal end of a conflict and not exclusively after the formal end to hostilities. Working with groups at the local level also permits programmes that assist the conflict-affected groups to be undertaken in such conflict situations as Somalia where there is no central state body.

74. Coordination between the different actors – local and international – is also necessary because **reintegration programmes should be viewed as a matrix with interactions that generate economies of scale and dynamic synergies**, rather than as a list of discrete projects/programmes implemented by each of the different actors in isolation. The rein-

tegration matrix of programmes would typically include the following:

- social facilities, including education, health and housing;

- rehabilitation of plants to facilitate formal-sector employment growth;

- labour-based public works;

- skills training designed for self-employment;

- credit, tools and other business support for small and micro enterprises; and

- life skills training, including trauma counselling.

75. In rural areas, these programmes would be supplemented by others focusing on agricultural livelihoods. The problem of landlessness and conflicts over land would be addressed as part of increasing livelihoods and reducing tensions. With property relations resolved, more technical

programmes for provision of seeds, tools and extension services can be implemented. An important employment-intensive works programme for rural areas would be clearance of anti-personnel mines, for which there is growing international funding. Such mine clearance is also critical for resumption of economic and social life, especially in the rural areas.

2.3 Other prerequisites for the design and implementation of programmes

76.   The success of reintegration programmes depends on two major aspects: (1) appropriate design on the basis of concrete needs, and (2) a facilitating implementation environment. However excellent the design of programmes may be, they will fail if the political and economic conditions limit implementation. The necessary condition for a programme to be a "good" one is that it can be effectively implemented. Effective implementation has several prerequisites.

Political prerequisite

77.   The political situation must be accommodating. This will be the case if the parties to the conflict have reached a tentative political settlement which lays the basis for national reconciliation. Settlements are a process rather than an event, which implies that judgement and flexibility of interpretation is called for when assessing the adequacy of political conditions for programme implementation. As part of the political settlement, there may be a government statement of the general framework for reintegration. Implementation is unlikely to be effective in the absence of a clear framework, which might include com-

mitment to delivering benefits in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner.

78.   When reintegration programmes include international support, implementation follows from an agreement among the government, external donors, and international agencies, such as the ILO. While in part a technical agreement for efficient management, this is also a political process in which the input and role of external actors is established. On this basis, partnerships can emerge between national and international agencies, which at the implementation level can also be extended to NGOs and special-interest groups of conflict-affected people. In successfully implemented programmes, these partnerships are the basis of a two-way exchange of views from the national to the local level. Out of this exchange develops the consultative and participatory process which can overcome the weakness of institutions caused by conflict.

Cultural and ethnic diversity

79.   Over and above the ethnic diversity of the conflict-affected groups, the cultural diversity should also be recognized as very important. Some conflicts actually heighten the degree of differences between the ethnic and cultural groups of the country. Such cultural and ethnic diversity and developments and sensitivities within this area have to be taken into account in the design of the reintegration programmes. Every effort has to be made to make such programmes inclusive and perceived as beneficial to all the different groups.

Programming and implementation at the different phases

Table 1: Implementation under differing conflict conditions

Conflict status (not necessarily sequential): Elements of the Action programme (can they be implemented?)	Low level violence, regionally scattered	Generalized violence throughout country (with/without a functioning government)	Peace process (with/without violence)
Background studies: • needs assessment • labour force surveys	YES (except for regions directly affected by violence)	YES (all work need not be done in country; in-country work can be restricted to major, if secure)	YES (if violence persists)
Planning of projects	YES (as above)	YES (as above)	YES (as above)
Social & labour policy actions	YES	YES (preparation)	YES (legislation)
Training, micro enterprises, employment schemes	YES (as above)	NO (except in rare situations where certain areas are secure)	YES (as above)
Activities for non-combatants (including social protection, social services)	YES (as above)	NO (through work with NGOs, labour & employers may be possible)	YES (as above)
Activities specific to demobilized soldiers	YES (if demobilization has begun) NO (if not)	NO (the number of combatants is probably increasing, not decreasing)	YES (training can begin in demobilization camps)

80.   Implementation success is related to conditions of the moment. Some reintegration activities require a greater degree of consensus, security, and institutional strength than others. Table 1 demonstrates this generalization concretely by relating different phases of programming to different conditions of conflict. Draft legislation can be prepared during conflict for consideration when a stable government and provisional legislature is in place. Equitable and fair rules of labour market governance, concrete and detailed, signal a commitment to a just and inclusive process of reconciliation.

81.   Once violence abates, programmes can be initiated that deliver skills and employment to consolidate the peace process by giving conflict-affected groups an interest in sustaining non-conflict conditions. At this stage, or even earlier as the situation allows, demobilization of combatants can be implemented.

82.   Strict adherence to this chronology may not be possible in all conflict situations, but a general guideline holds: **collection of**

information, design of programmes, and long-term planning can and should be carried out while tensions remain high. The relevant prerequisite is a commitment to a negotiated peace by the parties to the conflict. Preparation of programmes will contribute to transforming that commitment to a peace settlement.

Management and monitoring structures

83. A nation-wide and central management and monitoring structure is required for the programmes of reintegration, even those that are community based. One important role for central administration is ensuring consistency and equity in programmes across regions of a country. In part, this is achieved through coordination among implementing actors, but coordination alone is usually not sufficient. If programmes by different agencies deliver different levels and types of benefits for the same activities, perception of inequitable treatment can result. It is the role of a central administration to establish standards and levels of delivery.

84. The experience from different countries of coordinating demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants provides some lessons for centrally managing general programmes of reintegration, but the lessons are limited. Demobilization and reintegration programmes are based upon a targeted population and usually are allocated special funding outside ministerial budget lines. As a result, these programmes can be implemented and monitored by a specially created body, which has a limited need to coordinate with established ministries. General programmes to cover the entire range of conflict-affected people cannot in practice be administered in this manner. So great are the needs and so broad the scope of these programmes that their implementation requires altering previous priorities within established ministries. In effect, the entire government social and economic budget becomes the reintegration programme.

85. Experience suggests that a number of organizational vehicles can perform the central management role. In many countries, a separate ad hoc administrative body is created within government to manage reintegration programmes, cutting across specialized ministries such as Ministries of Labour, Agriculture, Health, and Education. This approach can produce its own problems of coordination, if the hierarchy of decision-making between ministries and the ad hoc body are not clear. For example, the creation in South Africa of a post-apartheid reconstruction programme (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) lacked clear lines of authority which were accepted by line ministries. On the other hand, reintegration programmes by their nature cannot be assigned to a single ministry, except in countries where there is already a "super ministry" whose authority is superior to others. Such a new structure is also often set up for a short while, and it does not prepare other existing structures, such as the Ministry of Labour. No general guideline is possible, except to observe that some central administrative umbrella is necessary to avoid duplication of activities and to achieve complementarities and that the know-how and resources generated by the projects/programmes should feed into the development of the capacity of existing institutions to contribute to long-term peace. Another suggestion (ILO, October 1997) is to establish a task force on skills and employment promotion, to be led by the Ministry of Labour but including representatives of other government departments, NGOs, entrepreneurs, United Nations organizations, trade unions and community groups. After completion of

reintegration programmes, this task force would hand over its functions and activities to the Ministry of Labour.

86.   At the same time, effective management and implementation of reintegration and peace-building programmes will depend on coordination among the international agencies involved, and on their close cooperation with a national umbrella organization, as earlier mentioned. Thus, bodies such as the ILO and other components of the UN system including the Department of Peace Keeping (DPKO)and the UNDP will have to work together. This is also important to the development of efficiency within the UN system.

2.4 Programme constraints

87.   It is necessary to highlight some of the major constraints that may hamper the ability to adapt these guidelines to local conditions and implement effective programmes. A few of the more pressing constraints which are likely to prevail at the level of generality adopted throughout this document are noted here. Certain factors mentioned in different parts of the document are brought together in summary form. The constraints include:

- **Political environment.** Before, during and after a conflict there may not be sufficient political will to allow for an effective programme that meets the requirements laid out in this document, such as the need to pursue an inclusionary approach to all programme components. This can still be a problem after the formal end of hostilities, since, as this document has noted, political and socio-economic insecurity tend to persist after the signing of a peace agreement. A particularly problematic case might be

where tensions between the constituents of the tripartite base of the ILO's partners are right at the root of a given conflict situation. This would make it especially hard to proceed along the lines set out in these guidelines. Another particular case would be where, beyond typical institutional weakness, the very existence of a state is doubtful.

- **Extreme institutional weakness.** Institutional weakness will be a constraint on the effectiveness of programmes in all conflict-affected countries, but in some cases this may be especially acute, frustrating even the most basic of capacity-building objectives. This situation would call for a high degree of flexibility in programming by external and national actors. Where there is the political will and a facilitating environment but a high degree of institutional weakness, there may be a case for greater reliance on external and more highly localized national organizations initiating the programme. But the objective should remain to develop institutional capacity for sustainable momentum of labour market policies, training infrastructure, business development initiatives, etc.

- **Extreme infrastructural weakness and economic fragmentation.** Where infrastructure provision is at a very low level and fragmentary and where the economy in general is weak and fragmented, information will be especially hard to collect, and it may be very difficult to reach target communities with a genuinely integrated programme. Again, this will call for some flexibility, so that excessively high and rigid standards of programme integrity and complementarity are not adhered to beyond their pragmatic use.

- **Weak external coordination.** This will place a particularly high strain on the already weak local capacity for

coordination and capacity development, as well as frustrating objectives for programmes to have a high national and local "ownership" factor. It is also sadly realistic to acknowledge that different international actors at times have their own agendas and methodologies. It is suggested that the best way to try to resolve this problem or to prevent it occurring is to ensure that mechanisms for coordination are in place very early on.

n **Landmines.** Physical insecurity, most obviously in the form of landmines whose distribution is often unclear even to those who sowed them, is a constant constraint on the speed with which reintegration can be realized. There are other sources of insecurity that can frustrate programme ambitions: for example, persistent or rising levels of criminality, usually a problem in and around major towns and on arterial infrastructure connections.

n **Climatic volatility.** Weather patterns are difficult to predict, and in some parts of the world events such as a severe drought can add to the stresses on livelihoods, especially rural, and therefore undermine the effectiveness of reintegration programmes.

n **Volatile macroeconomic conditions.** High inflation, low incomes, consumer goods shortages and other features of macroeconomic insecurity can all undermine the ability of reintegration programmes to deliver. For example, income-generating projects or vocational training in rural off-farm artisanery can fail if there are no markets for products, or if input costs are too high, or if there is too little incentive to increase market connections due to severe goods shortages.

3. PROGRAMME GUIDELINES

3.1 Overview

88.   This chapter highlights for specific programmes the key principles, challenges, constraints and opportunities in the needs of conflict-affected countries. The programmes include labour market initiatives, infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion, vocational training and life skills, and enterprise promotion. This range of programmes covers the demand and supply sides of the labour market, with a view to pursuing the objective of working for a lasting peace. Table 2 indicates general aspects of skills training and employment promotion programmes for conflict-affected countries, while it is fully understood that particular programmes cannot proceed in individual countries without being based on a close analysis of the causes of conflict and the dynamics and diverse effects of conflict.

Table 2: Skills training and employment generation in conflict-affected countries

Programme focus by sector (Relative importance of programme categories depends on structure of the economy)			
Rural sector		Urban sector	
On-farm employment	Non-farm employment	Formal employment	Informal employment
All people: Land for the landless; Farm production packages; Extension services; Credit provision; Rehabilitation of marketing & post-harvest facilities; Protection of rights of farm workers (application of basic ILO conventions)	All people: Vocational training for self-employment; Business training; Credit provision; Labour-based public works (esp. to enhance marketing & post-harvest facilities)	All people: Social accord between employers & trade unions for employment growth; On-the-job skills training; Protection of collective bargaining & workers' rights; Public works focusing on war damage; Public provision & support to self-help housing; Reallocation of public expenditure to promote employment in social sectors (with flexible provision, e.g through NGOs, trade unions, employers' organizations)	All people: Vocational training for self-employment through skills centres; Business & commercial training through skills centres; Credit provision; Apprenticeship programmes; Public provision & support to self-help housing; Government regulation of labour standards; Government procurement from small enterprises

On-farm employment	Non-farm employment	Formal employment	Informal employment
In addition to the above, the following groups may require other supports:			
Demobilized combatants: "Mustering out" financial packages Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation Trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration	Demobilized combatants: "Mustering out" financial packages Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation Trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration	Demobilized combatants: "Mustering-out" financial packages Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation Trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration For some, integration into civilian police	Demobilized combatants: "Mustering-out" financial packages Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation Trauma counselling, including adjustment to reintegration
Women: Fostering self-help groups Anti-discrimination legislation, with emphasis on right to land	Women: Fostering self-help groups Anti-discrimination legislation	Women: Fostering self-help groups Anti-discrimination legislation	Women: Fostering self-help groups Anti-discrimination legislation
Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training Proactive job placement	Disabled persons: Appropriate medical assistance Special skills training
Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling (phased with agricultural cycle) Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business support	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business support	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business support	Children and youth: Provision of universal schooling Programmes for placement of orphans Vocational and business training for self-employment Credit and other business support
All rural groups: Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation skills Trauma counselling Drug counselling		**All urban groups:** Life skills training with emphasis on reconciliation skills Trauma counselling Drug counselling	

89. A number of key principles and features stand out from the preceding discussion and are emphasized in the guidelines elaborated here for the specific programmes. To facilitate the use of the guidelines, these key principles are briefly summarized below.

90. The principle of inclusion is applied to all programmes and given high priority. Social inclusion is an important consideration in the design of labour market policy and regulation. This principle should be given greater weight than abstract concepts of efficiency. Inclusion can be applied to training programmes, where it translates into the need to take training to trainees and communities and to involve communities in identifying beneficiaries and their needs. The principle of inclusion over-rides claims for segregated, targeted support to particular categories of the conflict-affected population. Otherwise, support programmes in conflict-affected countries risk being divisive. Once the principle of inclusion is adopted, it is important to make sure programmes incorporate and are sensitive to the needs of women, children, the disabled and ex-combatants.

91. The importance of early and continuous information gathering cannot be stressed enough. In every area where specific programmes are implemented, conflict is likely to have exacerbated the weakness of existing information bases. Programmes have to provide urgently needed information to ensure that their implementation is relevant and cost-effective. Each of the programmes should incorporate from the start measures to develop long-term and institutionalized information collection and analysis.

92. All experience in conflict-affected countries dramatizes the institutional weakness affecting programmes for reintegration, reconstruction and reconciliation. There are two major implications. First, it is important to dedicate resources to institutional capacity building, and this should be incorporated into the first stages of a programme. A specific example is the formation of local economic development agencies (LEDAs), as in Central America and Cambodia. Second, institutional weaknesses provide an opportunity to develop effective partnerships between a wide range of organizations, including government and quasi-government bodies, church groups, NGOs, private sector associations, employee associations and trade unions, and local community groups. Successful experiences suggest strongly that these institutional relationships are as important as, or possibly more important than, single institutions. The consequences of conflict present not just a challenge but a positive opportunity to avoid or replace a tendency towards one-dimensional institutional responses to challenges.

93. Training needs are immense in most conflict-affected countries. Training needs to be improved and expanded to meet identified needs of small and micro enterprises, business management and administration and vocational skills formation. This has resource implications, if the training challenge is to be met effectively and rapidly. It requires imaginative collaboration between funding bodies and implementing agencies, both public and private.

3.2 The labour market

Principles and priorities

94.   The labour market plays a key role in the transition from conflict to peace, for it includes the majority of the adult population. Labour markets function in a variety of ways, ranging from the inclusive to exclusive. Exclusive labour markets treat people solely as commodities, contributing little to social cohesion. The objective of the inclusive labour markets is to maximize the contribution that the labour market can make to ameliorating the effects of conflict and easing the transition to peace. This requires creating a labour market that functions efficiently while incorporating social values. In a conflict-affected country the labour market should maximize reintegration and social inclusion, not merely maximize labour absorption.

95.   Maximizing the potential of the labour market for contributing to peace building and conflict resolution requires policies and mechanisms to address three factors: the demand for labour, the supply of labour, and the information that connects demand and supply. First, this implies that labour market policies are inseparable from efforts to promote the private sector, including formal and informal business opportunities and small and micro enterprises. Second, there must be policies to overcome constraints on the supply of labour. These include policies to improve the conditions of work, stabilize the economy, promote freedom of movement within the country, and improve the skills of the labour force. Third, policies are needed that improve the information base of the labour market. These include information on the structure and trends of labour demand and business opportunities in the countries emerging from conflict (these tend to be the sectors of construction, transportation, communications, maintenance and security) that can feed into labour training and skills promotion

schemes. Data systems can also foster information sharing between the different actors in this sphere.

96.   As earlier noted in Chapter 2, labour market governance weakens during conflict. Policies that reconstruct labour market governance should deal with two factors. First, to play a socially healing role in a conflict-affected country, the labour market should provide for equitable treatment of workers. Otherwise, the mistrust and resentment on which conflict grew will be aggravated. Second, governance should avoid excessive regulation, which affects the incentive to hire labour and for small-scale business operators to function. The objective for programmers and policy makers is to move from a labour market with inefficient controls to one that effectively protects and facilitates the activities of workers and employers – large or small, informal or formal.

97.   In conflict-affected countries, labour markets are likely to be characterized by a greater than normal reliance on informal sector income-generating activities, either employment in often small and micro enterprises or informal sector self-employment. This aggravates the information problem that programmers are confronted with. It also means that a particular priority needs to be assigned to measures designed to facilitate the vigorous expansion and strengthening of this sector in conditions that approximate, if they do not actually fulfil exactly, the requirements of international labour standards. Monitoring will be difficult. But here again the success of a programme (in this case, those components designed to promote the informal sector) will be enhanced by an implementation and design strategy that is based on partnership and local participants having a stake in design. This is more likely to generate effective compliance with international labour standards and to create room for effective "voice mechanisms" for those engaged in informal sector enterprises.

Challenges and constraints

98.   To normalize labour markets of countries emerging from conflict, donors, governments, and groups in civil society need to debate the macroeconomic priorities with regard to raising employment. The employment challenge is to identify sectors of growth potential and to focus measures on these. There are typical constraints on the ability to meet this challenge. In some, but not all, conflict-affected countries, economic growth is slow and labour demand sluggish. Even when post-conflict economic growth is relatively fast, the post-conflict recovery may be concentrated in subsectors with little sustainability. A large proportion of employment opportunities will be in the informal sector. It is important to identify those informal sector activities which are the result of the temporary breakdown of the formal sector and those that will continue in the long term.

99.   Labour market information in conflict-affected countries is scarce and of poor quality. Conflict tends to worsen the problem through destruction of enterprises, diverting civil servants to conflict-related activities, disrupting social and productive infrastructure, and displacing parts of the population from their normal abodes and livelihoods.

100.   Coordination among government ministries and agencies tends to be ineffective in conflict-affected countries, which undermines labour market governance. Employment services, monitoring of working conditions, and social welfare mechanisms typically collapse under the weight of conflict. Thus, the post-conflict government inherits a socially fragmented labour force and limited resources to promote social reintegration through the labour market.

Labour market information, institutions and networks

101.   If the labour market is to play effectively a role in the reintegration of conflict-affected people, there is an urgent need for better information collection and management. Labour market information (LMI) is both limited and poorly organized for effective use in the conflict-affected context. The challenge is to collect useful information, compile it effectively, and marshall that information for employment promotion. Labour market information must be collected at different levels. At the most general level, governments should improve information on broad

Table 3: Establishing a labour market data base for conflict-affected countries

Stages in data base construction:
Identify the employment experience, expectations, and problems of the vulnerable, excluded and conflict-affected.
Analyse the causes of these problems.
Appraise options for tackling these problems.
Design programmes and a supporting policy framework.
Select priority projects.
Monitor implementation.
Evaluate projects and programmes with a view to adjusting labour market interventions.

Source: ILO: *Labour market assessments for the reintegration of ex-combatants in war-affected sub-Saharan African*

trends in the labour supply and demand, to reveal actual and potential shifts in employment opportunities and skill needs in both rural and urban areas. To be useful to planners and implementers, this information must be relevant, reliable, and collected continuously. It also should be made widely available in the public and private sectors. The basic steps in establishing a labour force data base are shown in table 3. Beyond its obvious role in labour market policy and project planning, labour market information is critical to the ongoing process of monitoring and evaluation that feed into the improvement of integrated programmes for conflict-affected countries (see diagram at the end of Chapter 2).

102.   In peace-time, labour force data bases comprise a wide range of information to be used for short-term adjustment policies and long-term manpower planning. In post-conflict situations, the emphasis is on the need to address immediate labour market policies. While the information gathered should be part of a longer-term data base accumulation, priorities must focus on the reintegration programme. This will usually require use of rapid appraisal techniques. Information must be geared not just to assessing the need for new skills but also to clarifying the spread of existing skills, with a view to utilizing these.

103.   Collection of information may be limited by a shortage of trained, experienced and motivated staff in those institutions devoted to labour market management, such as Ministries of Labour. Policy makers and programmers should begin with capacity building of key institutions, as a prerequisite to the pursuit of a committed labour market policy. This involves providing intensive training for existing and new personnel and improving conditions of work to increase motivation. The institutions and methodologies used in collecting the relevant data will vary with different phases of a conflict: pre-,

during and post-conflict. For example, questions on skills profiles and work experience can be incorporated into data gathered by the Red Cross, Red Crescent and the UNHCR in refugee camps and other transit points during a conflict or in the immediate aftermath of the signing of a formal peace agreement.

104.   In addition to improving working conditions, skills, and commitment within individual institutions, fostering coordination between labour market agencies is important to effective information collection. This involves division of labour, information sharing, and settling common priorities among, for example, the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Labour, and the central statistical office. At another level, these state bodies may be able to function more effectively by forming cooperative agreements with universities and research institutes, as well as private institutions such as NGOs and cooperatives. This broader institutional network enables survey work on employment opportunities and constraints, as well as maximizing the use of resources. An example of such cooperation is the survey work of the Centre for African Studies (CEA), within the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Mozambique, on expectations and problems faced by ex-combatants after the Mozambican war ended.

105.   Institutional links can provide for more that a one-way flow of information from researchers to government, or from employers to government. They can be used interactively to interchange information across sectors, institutions and regions where labour market policies will be implemented. Labour market programmers can use NGOs and local community organizations to alert people to available training schemes and can combine such institutional networks with the use of the media.

106.   Along with government policies addressing the labour market as a whole, there will usually be an urgent need for spe-

cial employment promotion programmes. In most countries these focus on a range of needs, including rural development with off-farm employment, the urban informal sector with promotion of micro enterprises, labour-intensive works schemes, local employment initiatives, and self-employment. Each of these has its own unique planning aspects. For example, in programmes that address rural development for reintegration, close attention should be given to institutional, technological and infrastructural constraints. These constraints overlap: providing training for small-scale artisanal production requires complementary improvement of infrastructure for access to inputs and for marketing options. Here, coordination is the key. Successful local programmes require local participation and to be part of a centrally-designed policy framework.

107.   Successful institutional partnerships also require development of support services. These include information dissemination through labour exchanges, the media, local communities, and NGOs. These institutions can facilitate short-term training for relatively small numbers of people in specific skills or techniques. At the same time, there should be links to larger, formal sector programmes. Every programme should have an explicit commitment to ensure that labour exchanges, job placement schemes and job search facilities are all free from discrimination on gender, race, language or religious grounds or on the basis of disability.

The key informant system

108.   The labour market information collected should be as thorough as possible, and its collection and revision should be institutionalized. However, it is highly unlikely that this can be achieved quickly in the context of a conflict or its immediate aftermath. It should not be expected that all the conflict-affected countries, with the diversity in their economies, could meet the same requirements for data collection. Expectations of data quality and quantity should reflect the specific circumstances of each country and conflict. Where data are scarce and the capacity for collection is low, policy makers, programmers and donors should make it a priority to allocate resources to technical assistance for institutional and personal capacity building. The ILO could play the key role in providing such assistance.

109.   In conflict-affected circumstances, it may be impossible or impractical to carry out technically satisfactory surveys, due to lack of personnel, security problems, or time constraints. In place of these, the so-call Key Informant System (KIS) has proven effective in the rapid appraisal of employment problems. This involves identifying reliable and well-informed individuals in social institutions which provide information on a range of issues. Applications of the approach have included:

- conducting specific surveys of employing establishments to assess manpower shortages and training needs;

- multi-purpose research in villages to develop a data base for local planning;

- rural surveys to monitor local employment projects; and

- surveys in rural and coastal villages (such as carried out in Somalia) to be used to create productive jobs and to improve skills.

110.   Where possible, this tool should not be used to conduct one-off ad hoc, information gathering exercises, but should be part of a broader information gathering programme. This would allow "cross checks" from different sources on the reliability of informants. The KIS approach could prove especially valuable in conflict-affected countries, given the poor information and the extra load that the informal sector typically bears in absorbing the labour force.

Migration and labour markets

111.   Conflict-affected situations provoke movements of people, often massive relative to the size of the population. This migration is typically viewed negatively, but labour mobility is important to reintegration and adjustment to conflict conditions. In the aftermath of a conflict, migration does not only involve refugees returning to their pre-conflict places of origin. Regional imbalances in levels of development are often exacerbated by conflict, because destruction of transport infrastructure makes remote areas less accessible. The rapidity of the rehabilitation of infrastructure will vary by region.

Thus, for many refugees, return to places of origin may be impractical or unattractive. To facilitate people's reintegration into labour markets, constraints on mobility need to be reduced throughout the conflict-affected country.

112.   Labour migration is an uprooting and often traumatic experience, especially when families have been separated. Migrant labourers are especially susceptible to maltreatment, because it is hard for them to draw on support mechanisms of local communities. Hence, it is important in conditions of flux and uncertainty that there are measures and institutions that protect the rights of migrant workers. If not, they can become a focal point for rising social tensions.

3.3 Employment-intensive works programmes

Basic principles

113.   Infrastructure rehabilitation and extension play a central role in most post-conflict recovery programmes. Along with rehabilitation, improvements to infrastructure are vital to the social, economic and even political cohesion of a society. They contribute to long-term development, as well as immediately stimulating local economic recovery. Infrastructural improvements provide access to markets, facilitate the spread of information, and physically reintegrate a country. Infrastructure is also critical to the prospects for ensuring the environmentally sustainable use of land and the prevention of famine.

114.   Inadequate infrastructural distribution can contribute to conflict. For example, the neglect of road and rail links to particular areas of Sierra Leone, combined with the deterioration of the educational system, contributed to the spread of violence from Liberia. In Mozambique the colonial infrastructure did little to link the parts of the country, thus perpetuating locally perceived differences among the north, central, and northern regions of the country. The physical separation of the country facilitated politicians playing on regional identity. This example indicates that rehabilitation of pre-conflict infrastructure may not be sufficient to integrate the country socially; construction of new transport and communication links may be necessary.

115.   Infrastructure works, both public and private, have great potential for creating employment, and employment generation is critical to ensure the durability of peace settlements. Livelihoods, even temporary, give people a "stake" in peace and narrow the scope for the disaffected elite to draw on marginalized or excluded groups. The degree of labour intensity in infra-structure works is, however, variable and needs to be considered at an early stage.

116.   The role, design and management of infrastructure projects should be at the top of the agenda for post-conflict rehabilitation. In those countries where infrastructure has been badly affected by conflict, or where inappropriate infrastructure contributed to the conflict, discussion of infrastructure works should be included in political and economic negotiations that accompany formal peace settlements.

Post-conflict insecurity and landmines

117.   Civil wars often have ambiguous beginnings and rarely reach a sharply defined end. Insecurity tends to persist beyond the signing of a formal peace agreement. This insecurity can be both political and economic; it can be characterized by high levels of crime, which may or may not be sharply distinguished from political sources of insecurity. As a result, the location of labour-intensive infrastructure works must be selected with care. The need for such projects may be greatest where conflict has raged most intensely, where insecurity survives the formal end of hostilities. A major cause of insecurity is the existence of a large, but unknown number of landmines scattered over fields and infrastructural facilities. In some areas, information in rural areas is vague at best, while in others, such as the Luwero Triangle in Uganda, local people may have a clear idea of where landmines lie. When infrastructure works are planned, local knowledge should be sought. Where landmines are a significant factor, infrastructure works should not proceed without prior clearance operations. A close working relationship among local communities, infrastructure teams, and those clearing mines is essential.

118.   There are potential synergies between labour-intensive public works and landmine clearance. Some mine clear-

ance operations are conducted with little regard for the absorption of local labour or the creation of skills. By positive contrast, the Halo Trust and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) advocate training demobilized soldiers in the skills for landmine clearance and the removal of unexploded ordnance. These skills can have subsequent non-military uses.

Labour intensity of infrastructure schemes

119.   There is consensus that employment-maximizing technologies should be used in infrastructure works in low-income countries. However, governments often remain committed to more capital-intensive techniques. Governments and other actors should be encouraged to consider the benefits that may accrue to more labour-intensive methods. Evidence suggests that labour-intensive methods can be cost-effective and less of a drain on scarce resources, notably foreign exchange. Evidence also suggests that labour-intensive methods need not compromise durability and quality of infrastructure. The examples

of Cambodia and Mozambique indicate this (see Box 1 below). All technologies require policy makers to strike a balance between labour absorption and the quality of output.

120.   It is especially important that policy makers review the maintenance implications of a technology. Maintenance costs tend to be underestimated, especially in conflict-affected countries. The importance of reviewing maintenance costs is all the greater in conflict-affected countries because there are likely to be tight constraints on funding for maintenance and limited skills and equipment to carry it out.

121.   Labour-intensive infrastructure works in conflict-affected countries are capable of generating income and effective demand in disrupted regions. For example, more than 1.5 million workdays were generated in projects in Cambodia through the reconstruction of roads, repair of irrigation systems, and rehabilitation of the World Heritage site of Angkor. The associated demand for consumer goods and productive inputs rejuvenated rural markets. Macroeconomic conditions are important for the income-generating success of labour-intensive works. For example, in

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Box 1: Degrees of labour intensity in Cambodia

In Cambodia after the 1991 peace agreement, there were two techniques: that of the ILO, a labour-based technology, and that of the UNDP CARERE projects, a labour-intensive technology. The more labour-intensive approach of CARERE projects used virtually no input other than labour and hand tools. Although this may maximize labour absorption and hence appear to fulfil a key objective of post-conflict rehabilitation, doubts have been expressed about the quality of the work done by this method. ILO projects were based on the principle that, as well as securing labour absorption benefits, infrastructure projects should bear in mind other objectives too, including the durability and quality of works. On this basis, a labour-based technology mixes labour with light equipment, especially for some aspects of infrastructure work on roads and irrigation schemes. Quality assurance is viewed as particularly important in the light of the need not just to respond to immediate post-conflict needs but also to begin to tackle longer-term developmental needs and to generate sufficient credibility for the overall principle of labour absorption, so that this may more readily be adopted at national government and international donor levels wherever possible.

the immediate aftermath of conflict, cash payments may be dramatically devalued by inflation and shortages of goods. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to consider a mix of cash and payment in kind.

Long-term aspects of infrastructure rehabilitation

122.   An important lesson of works programmes in Cambodia, Uganda, and Mozambique is that the challenge of infrastructure regeneration is enormous and will continue long after the end of a conflict. At the same time, it provides the opportunity to implement a relief-rehabilitation-development continuum. Reintegration programmes should work on the general principle that interventions incorporate a long-term developmental objective where possible. This should apply to employment-oriented infrastructure works as well as to skills training. For infrastructure works, there are two main implications. First, it is necessary to explore the potential links between infrastructure works and long-term, sustainable employment prospects. Maintenance work can provide this. Second, there is a need to focus training, for local contractors and their employees, on skills that can be transferred from short-term rehabilitation to long-term maintenance.

123.   Country experiences suggest ways of incorporating long-range goals into immediate post-conflict projects. Given that urgency drives most of the early post-conflict projects, there is often a tendency to overlook maximizing local involvement in favour of quick and effective use of overseas skills. A strong feature of ILO projects in north-west Cambodia, for example, was that they trained people with a view to forthcoming infrastructure works. This was carried out in refugee camps along the Thai border before the Paris Agreement was signed in 1991. This training made it easier to include Cambodians in the implementation of projects when they began.

This example also highlights the specificity of each situation. Training is likely to be more useful where there is a relatively stable refugee population. In other, less-stable situations, for example in the refugee camps inside Zaire (Congo) after the Rwandan conflict, such a forward-looking approach is less feasible.

Institutional partnerships for employment-intensive works

124.   There is no single "best practice" for institutional partnerships and labour-intensive infrastructure works in conflict-affected countries. This will invariably be determined at the local level. Those designing and taking part in infrastructure rehabilitation programmes should begin by setting clear goals and objectives for the implementation of infrastructure rehabilitation. If long-term cost effectiveness and capacity building are important as well as labour absorption, modifications are necessary to the technology in use. It would be appropriate to implement through a variety of institutions, including central and provincial government bodies, local contractors, associations of demobilized soldiers, and other conflict-affected groups. Local communities should have a voice in determining who is employed in labour-intensive infrastructure works, though not to the exclusion of vulnerable groups such as women that tend to be discriminated against. Box 2 outlines three major approaches to partnerships in infrastructure in post-conflict Mozambique.

Management requirements

125.   Labour-intensive infrastructure and public works schemes are management intensive. They require effective means of supervising employees, choosing local contracting firms, and ensuring quality of work. Technical monitoring is necessary to verify that labour-based technologies are actually

Box 2: Technology and institutional partnerships in Mozambique

In Mozambique, several approaches have been adopted by institutions involved in infrastructure rehabilitation, in particular in the improvement of the rural feeder road network. There is the ILO approach, linked to central government support and using labour-based technology. Another is that of the UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA – since May 1997 known as the Department for International Development, DFID). This model used the ILO-type of technique but depended less institutionally on central government and worked more closely with local contractors. Third, the Danish NGO IBIS has implemented projects that are more labour intensive, using the minimum of equipment from private owners. IBIS road-building projects have relied for petrol-powered equipment needs solely on one tractor and trailer for each work brigade of approximately 200 labourers. By contrast, the ILO approach involved hiring labour to clear bush, remove trees, excavate side drains and reshape carriage ways, and to excavate gravel from pits along the road, and then using tractor drawn trailers to carry gravel to the road site. Loading and unloading was also manual, but tractor-drawn grading machines performed the camber formation and levelling, and tractor-drawn vibrating rollers did the final compacting. In Mozambique, the IBIS approach won favour with many donors, since it has more immediate labour use, as well as allegedly being more cost-effective than the ILO technologies. Those in favour of the IBIS projects concede that this approach may compromise quality. This case provides an example of the kind of dilemma that is likely to be faced, not only in conflict-affected countries but to some extent especially acutely in such countries where there is a premium on employment generation as part of the process of building peace, but where this should not necessarily be at the expense of longer-term sustainability.

in use. Managerial and administrative capacity is especially scarce in conflict-affected countries and particularly so at provincial and local levels. This scarcity may arise from a country's low level of development, from migration, and from the administrative demands of reintegration programmes. Resources must be allocated to the rapid improvement in managerial and administrative skills. Even if infrastructure rehabilitation is short term, there will be positive externalities to society from investment in skills upgrading in this area. These skills will be applicable in other sectors of the economy once rehabilitation of infrastructure is complete. In the short term, it may be necessary to seek overseas expertise. This option should be taken only in combination with apprentice and other training schemes to raise the stock of domestic skills.

Cohesive and divisive infrastructure

126.   Employment schemes should take account of the possibility that rehabilitation and construction of productive infrastructure can be as divisive as for social infrastructure. The former, since it is directly income generating, may appear to favour one group over others. Therefore, the principle of inclusiveness may call for an initial priority to social infrastructure. This may prove difficult in practice, where communities have suffered severe damage to irrigation systems and post-harvest storage and marketing facilities. At the least, programmes should be designed with awareness of post-conflict tensions.

3.4 Vocational training and life skills

The context and challenge

127. Conflict interrupts skills development for many wage-earning and self-employment activities. Conflict also disrupts the typical social mechanisms through which people develop social skills. As a result, the immediate post-conflict period may be characterized by a skills and education crisis.

128. The social and economic context changes dramatically during conflict. An industry providing the bulk of employment in a community may be destroyed. Farming may be disrupted indefinitely because of uncleared landmines. Rural communities may face a different demographic structure after a conflict because of deaths and migration. Families may be separated and the main income earner killed. Most soldiers are unlikely to acquire civilian skills in military service, so they enter civilian society untrained and disoriented.

129. As a consequence, there will be the need for a wide variety of training provision in urban and rural areas. At the same time, conflict often happens in countries in which there is a severe shortage of teachers and trainers and where there has been damage to the training infrastructure. Indeed, conflict itself can bring about a worsening of this shortage; or where conflict is protracted, training staff skills can become obsolete due to war-time neglect. Moreover, in conflict-affected countries training equipment and facilities become obsolete or are destroyed by neglect or direct damage. Hence, there is not just a massive need for training, but a pressing need to rebuild the training infrastructure, including the physical and technical infrastructure, and to upgrade staff skills as well as to add to training staff. In such a context, a wide range of training providers will have to be used.

Training options

130. There are various options available for vocational and practical training programmes in conflict-affected countries. One can distinguish between programmes that target specific groups, such as demobilized combatants, disabled persons, women, and children, and those that are community and need based. Both types are necessary. When funds are allocated to demobilization, and when this involves holding ex-combatants in camps for a period, there is an opportunity to survey needs, compile information on their skill profiles and expectations, and even implement some training activities for them. This could form the basis for further development of focused vocational training conducted in partnership with associations of conflict veterans. Examples of such associations that have participated in partnerships are the government-sponsored Veterans' Assistance Board (UVAB) of Uganda in 1992 and the Association of Mozambican Demobilized Troops (AMODEG) in Mozambique.

131. Within these vocational training programmes the specific needs of female ex-combatants should also be met. The programmes should further adapt training courses for disabled persons. In general, there is a higher social return if one includes vulnerable groups in general programmes than if they are segregated into separate programmes. The inclusive approach mixes people so that provision of vocational and practical training provides for sharing experiences and reconciliation.

132. A practical means of achieving the inclusive approach is to provide training in communities rather than in separate centres away from locations where skills will be applied. Designated training centres are perhaps most useful when created in response to private-sector demand for special skills. For most training, provider units can be mobile and able to deliver to trainees, rather than trainees finding it neces-

sary to relocate to avail themselves of benefits.

133. Training provision should be demand led. A demand focus can help avoid exclusionary targeting. It can also reduce the need to organize vocational and practical training in large centres, which may require expensive equipment. A successful demand focus involves collecting information on the profiles, expectations and needs of the beneficiaries. This can partly be done by using the Key Informant System (KIS, see paragraph 109). Information should also be gathered in communities, among public and private employers, and by developing relationships between training organizations and local development projects.

134. The building of some effective ILO vocational training programmes in some conflict--affected countries has been structured around a hard core consisting of: (i) training of short-term duration in the skill areas which are most promising for labour absorption; and (ii) the promotion of small-scale enterprises and self-employment. Such programmes upstream hinge on the collection of relevant data such as on the profiles of the conflict-affected groups, the skill providers and vocational guidance and information services. Downstream, the programmes provide technical and financial support mechanisms (credit, training in management, tool kits, follow-up support services, etc.) for those trained to be able to set themselves up in self-employment businesses. The multi-dimensional aspect of the programmes have contributed to their success.

Institutional partnerships and training of trainers

135. The appropriate mix of institutions involved in vocational and practical training programmes will vary according to the nature of local labour markets.

National bodies, trade unions, employer associations and government ministries will have a role to play to identify training needs and assess options for provision. A training programme will have greater flexibility if it draws on a wide range of institutions. NGOs and local communities should be included in programme planning, identifying trainees, and recruiting trainers. Attempts to establish a uniform, centrally administered training programme in a conflict-affected country will usually be expensive and ineffective. The practical alternative is to use a variety of institutions for provision, mixing public and private systems. To increase efficiency, there should be coordination and information sharing between the various institutions involved, with a lead or convening body where the provider institutions are represented.

136. The gap between the needs of beneficiaries and availability of trainers can be narrowed through an effective training of trainers' scheme. Where possible, this could include people who are not experienced trainers, but have practical experience in specific skills. Two ways for operationalizing this could be explored: developing traditional apprenticeship schemes, and training practitioners in teaching methods. Both have resource implications, since there is a cost to time spent training either on-site apprentices or groups of off-site trainees.

Incorporating life skills training

137. Conflicts develop when there is already a shortage of life skills, the personal capacity to adjust socially and reconcile tensions. Life skills encompass a wide range of generic skills aimed at helping trainees to cope with transition periods from war to peace. Life skills training is vital in a post-conflict situation, as it addresses skill gaps which impede the economic (re)integra-

tion of those affected by the conflict. Such skills enable trainees to prepare for employment in periods immediately following armed conflict. In a sense, life skills envisage the need for a holistic approach to reintegration whereby people are not just provided with vocational training but are also equipped with the information and skills with which to survive within the labour market and to survive physically and mentally from the effects of war. Life skills are geared to peacefully strengthen survival capacities by providing orientation, basic education, pertinent health messages, and social and basic management skills.

> "Life skills training should be linked to or embedded in regular education and training courses. In this context, it is important to give life skills as much credit as other subjects to strengthen their importance."
> (Lobner, 1997)

138. Lessons from South Africa, Uganda and elsewhere suggest that there are many possible ways to deliver life skills: schools, demobilization camps, career guidance centres, labour exchanges, and religious groups, to name the most obvious. Meeting vocational and practical training needs can provide one route to deliver life skills. While training is provided to a group in the skills of agriculture, carpentry, etc., parallel and integrated sessions could focus on individual adjustment to post-conflict conditions, for more effective employment and self-employment. There is a particular need in conflict-affected countries for training geared towards keeping social communities and workplaces free from sectarian intimidation and discrimination.

139. Successful life skills programmes must be inclusive, practical and personal, not organized with formal syllabi delivered to passive students. Teaching methods may include role playing and other unorthodox approaches. This teaching requires confidence and sensitivity by trainers and may work better with local trainers and NGO practitioners than with professional teachers. Success in life skills programmes will also depend on careful assessment of local needs. This can be done through surveys of community leaders. Within life skills training, there should be separate modules for specific groups, for example health information for girls and women.

140. Life skills training will be particularly effective if it draws on the experiences of people being trained. For example, there may be people in a community who have experiences of collective organization during a political struggle; these experiences can be adapted to peacetime. The experiences of returning migrants, who accumulated a range of life skills by their migration, is another source of trainee input. There is, however, a danger that providers of life skills courses might not take adequate account of the context in which people live. The objective of life skills training is to empower people to make informed decisions. In practice, people may face circumstances in which their decisions are extremely constrained.

3.5 Private-sector small and micro businesses and entrepreneurs

Principles and context

141. Planners should consider an overall framework for delivering training in business skills that covers all levels of enterprises, from micro to large-scale enterprises. Scale of operation affects the needs of entrepreneurs, but it may be a mistake at the planning level to segregate small operators into a totally separate programme. Such segregation tends to reinforce prejudices that small firms represent employment of last resort, rather than viable and productive enterprises. In practice, skills delivery to small enterprises will require separate modules. This should not result in assigning them lower priority or less professional services. This inclusive approach can be administered through Ministries of Trade and Industry within an overall planning framework for enterprise development.

142. There are few general principles for the encouragement of business in conflict-affected countries, because of differences in levels of development. It is not useful to specify cross-country "best practice" with regard to focusing resources, policies and programmes on large or small businesses, on formal or informal sector firms, on new or old enterprises. Enterprises of different types and sizes can play complementary roles to rejuvenate economic activity, create jobs, and rebuild economic and social infrastructure. For example, even where an informal sector characterized by small enterprises accounts for the greatest share of economic activity, this sector may still not by itself be the engine of growth and may offer, obviously, only a limited tax revenue base. Such a sector is also likely to depend on the existence and health of larger more formal sector business. In other words,

small and large, formal and informal interact: programmes should not be designed on the basis of unrealistically rigid distinctions. Governments should be neutral between national and foreign investors.

143. Because most conflict-affected countries are low income, the small-firm sector provides a major proportion of employment. For example, the ILO has estimated that small and micro enterprises together provide employment for about 60 per cent of the labour force in Africa, in contrast to 20 per cent by the formal sector (government, public services, and large and medium private enterprises). In Cambodia, a predominantly rural country, small and micro enterprises increased in number after the reforms of 1990, with some 32,500 enterprises employing about 70,300 people in urban areas.

144. The potential for formal enterprises and small and micro enterprises to contribute to the consolidation of peace and the reactivation of the economy will depend on a variety of factors. It is especially important that enterprise promotion is linked to demand for goods and services. Promotion programmes should take account of infrastructure constraints and seek to integrate programmes into infrastructure rehabilitation. One potential source of small enterprise growth is through subcontracting for infrastructure programmes, especially if the latter are labour intensive.

145. These guidelines and the case studies on which they are based have emphasized that conflict causes profound social and economic change. One aspect of this change is that entrepreneurs emerge during conflict to provision the military, for example. Successful "conflict entrepreneurs" accumulate financial assets and competitive experience that can potentially contribute to peacetime recovery. Depending on political conditions, it may be appropriate to facilitate these entrepreneurs to apply their capital and skills to peacetime reconstruction. This document

has, however, stressed that this highly sensitive issue depends on political circumstances (see paragraph 40).

Developing business skills and supportive services

146. Business skills, management, accountancy, etc. are frequently in short supply in conflict-affected economies. This applies both to large formal-sector firms and small firms – formal or informal. It is of particular importance for business skills training to provide to small enterprises the training which will allow them to be sustainable and also to expand and achieve economies of scale in a context often characterized by, inter alia, macroeconomic instability, lack of physical and social infrastructure, limited access to financial services, other inputs and markets, recurrent tension and lack of trust. Promotion of business skills especially for micro and small enterprises can, however, help to overcome some of the legacies of conflict by creating employment, generating income and reinforcing economic growth which will in turn re-create other business opportunities. An association or networking between the existing businesses, such as producers and merchants, can be an asset.

147. At the national level, an overall framework is needed to ensure consistency of policies and standards across regions. This is especially important in credit provision. A macroeconomic programme that results in high interest rates needs to be reviewed for its impact on enterprises of different sizes. Provision of training for small enterprises will prove futile if macroeconomic conditions favour large-scale producers.

148. All businesses, and especially micro and medium-sized enterprises, require a range of support services to help them seize market opportunities and to operate effectively. They include assistance in identification of business opportunities, provision of technical and managerial skills, help in preparation of feasible and strategic business plans, access to financial, extension and consultancy services and relevant information advice on marketing and sources for employee training. Business associations are an effective vehicle through which to supply such services. A successful approach is the promotion of Local Economic Development Agencies (LEDAs), such as in Cambodia and Central America (see Box 3) to deliver such services as business training, credit and counselling to micro and small enterprises. LEDAs can

Box 3: LEDAs in Cambodia

LEDAs were established in nine provinces of Cambodia after 1992 to provide services to emerging small businesses. There are two outstanding features of these LEDAs. First, rather than being project based, the LEDAs and the national NGO association (ACLEDA) that linked them were established as autonomous organizations. The institutional sustainability of ACLEDA was stressed from the start. This may have delayed implementation, but facilitated sustainability. Second, ACLEDA and the member LEDAs were developed in coordination with parallel programmes to provide vocational training and employment-intensive infrastructure rehabilitation works. Together these formed three planks of an integrated employment-generation programme. Infrastructure projects expanded market size and improved trade opportunities; vocational training upgraded technical skills; and both supported the growth of small and medium enterprises. (Hakemulder, 1997)

also facilitate dialogue between the relevant actors in the community to identify business opportunities, to plan small enterprises and other business activities linked to them, and to implement and monitor them.

149. Licensing and registration procedures are commonly complex and biased against smaller firms and can discourage them. In part, this can result from an official predilection for large enterprises because they are easier to monitor and tax. One step towards reducing the bias against small enterprises would be a review of zoning, health, and labour regulations. While small enterprises should not be given preferential regulations, many existing regulations are either irrelevant or unenforceable even for large operators. At the same time, some deregulation may be more to the advantage of large firms than small ones. The goal should be to protect workers across all establishments, while being neutral with regard to scale.

Lessons for business promotion

150. It needs to be stressed that small and large businesses alike will thrive if the macroeconomic environment is favourable. If the macro economy is stagnant, constrained by excessive stress on stabilization, business promotion and skills training will be wasted. To avoid this, enterprises of all sizes, as well as labour, should have an institutionalized method of providing input into macroeconomic policy.

151. In the sensitive political atmosphere in a conflict-affected country, there can be advantages to setting up business promotion institutions that have a high degree of independence from the government. As trust between the private and public sectors is restored, government can begin to play a large role to spread information and monitor business training

needs. Successful small enterprise development schemes show that it is possible quite rapidly to deliver support to many enterprises, once trust and cooperative partnerships have been established. Thus, local economic development associations can have a significant role in the process of reconciliation that underpins movement towards peace. Here, LEDAs can play a role equivalent or parallel to that of the district councils in Northern Ireland (see paragraph 73).

152. Lack of sustainable access to micro finance is a key constraint faced by micro and small enterprises in countries emerging from, or affected by, conflict. It has also been observed that many of the initiatives on micro finance and financial institutional development in such countries have been highly varied and largely unimpressive (Nagarajan, 1997). The effects of conflict include erosion or destruction of a number of the preconditions necessary for the smooth promotion of micro finance. Creating sustainable micro-finance institutions and schemes that deliver micro finance at conditions affordable and convenient to small-scale business operators who have lost their productive assets and, therefore, have no collateral in the conflict-affected context is very critical for promoting small-scale enterprises. Donor agencies, United Nations organizations and some international non-governmental organizations have promoted micro-finance programmes in a number of conflict-affected countries, often in an uncoordinated manner. Diverse approaches have been adopted which range from village banks and solidarity groups operating revolving funds and guarantee funds to major on-lending schemes involving public banks. The programmes' outreach and sustainability have not always been satisfactory. While some cases of success have occurred in rebuilding viable micro and other financial institutions in conflict-affected contexts, the process has usually demanded a longer

time and more effort than would be required in a stable and normal society. Reform of the sector is vital to stabilize the economy. There is need for coordination among the key players in this area for consensus on approaches to be followed. Substitutes for collateral are required, such as relying on village leaders and support groups. Regulatory guidelines for non-bank intermediaries will also have to be developed. Capacity building of the institutions and their staff involved in developing micro-financial and other services is critical in conflict-affected situations.

153. Effective credit provision requires prior investigation of the needs and conditions of the enterprises. Information to be gathered should include the nature of conflict-related constraints on small businesses, economic trends, prevailing policies, and assessment of business oppor-tunities by sector. This information would allow policy makers to judge the appropriate degree and focus of involvement in financial and business development schemes generally.

3.6 Social security and protection

154. It is important to recall that, during the same session when it adopted the Employment (Transition from War to Peace) Recommendation, 1944, the International labour Conference also adopted Recommendations (n.67) concerning Income Security, and (n.69) concerning Medical Care. These instruments paved the way to "modern" social security and social protection.

155. Adequate social security mechanisms may be of crucial importance for consolidating transition from war to peace. As a matter of fact, three out of the four "guarantees" provided through such mechanisms seem to be particularly relevant to the situation of conflict-affected countries. These are:

n guarantee of access to medical care;

n guarantee of basic resources;

n guarantee of an effective right to social integration and reintegration.

156. Social security mechanisms pre-exist conflict in many of the conflict affected areas. However, the situation at the outset of conflict often requires that these mechanisms be fundamentally revisited. The reasons for this are manifold, and include:

n the change in the condition of potential beneficiaries, some of whom may have been insured previously and/or whose employment and working conditions have been radically transformed;

n the emergence of vulnerable groups (refugees, displaced populations, disabled, orphans, widows etc.) not covered by social insurance mechanisms;

n the disruption in the normal functioning of institutions, which also affects social security organizations (payment of benefits; physical identification of pensioners; collapse of banking and postal services etc.);

n the decrease in the value of benefits (change in currency and inflation) and of accumulated reserve funds;

n the possible appearance of new forms of ownership and resulting inadequacy of existing social protection mechanisms (privatization, including that of medical facilities and social services);

n the possible dismantlement of the network of social services, due to lack of financial resources, to war destruction or to more ideological reasons; and

n the lack of experience of the authorities in facing newly emerging or more widespread social needs (acute poverty, massive unemployment, huge impairments, social destitution, difficulties in accessing basic facilities etc.).

157. Social peace and social justice go together. The latter also requires that the public authorities make all possible efforts for the populations in post-conflict situations to gain easy and equitable access to mechanisms to ensure that basic needs' satisfaction is not limited to one group or to a few groups, which would bring a perception of social discrimination in an already very difficult situation.

158. Social security in the post-conflict context may avoid this trap inter alia though the following measures:

n detailed review of existing social protection mechanisms in transition situation, including functional capacities, staffing, location, counterparts, financial means etc.;

n inventory of existing legal mechanisms enabling access to social protection for those in need (notably social insurance, social assistance and medical care);

- quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the means required to ensure access for the population to identified basic needs, and design of the corresponding mechanisms to ensure the satisfaction of such needs;

- establishment or revamping of a high-level social protection council or coordinating committee, comprising tripartite constituents and representatives of the other major national NGOs concerned, to ensure coherence in interventions at the global and decentralized levels;

- sensitization campaign with local authorities, to encourage them to establish appropriate social assistance and possibly insurance mechanisms to cover the most urgent needs of the populations, and support to the design and implementation of such mechanisms;

- sensitization campaign with workers and employers, to encourage them to revive the classical social insurance relationship, including contributions' collection, and action in favour of revitalizing the corresponding mechanisms;

- careful review of conditions of access to remaining medical facilities; as precise as possible social budgeting, based on identified needs and on existing or potential financial resources (including new, earmarked taxes in addition to contributions);

- specific monitoring of the system, including its social assistance and medical care components, with direct involvement of all competent decentralized actors; and

- design of medium term plans for progressive, integrated social protection development in a peaceful environment.

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4. ILO POTENTIAL ACTIONS

159.   For more detailed guidelines on ILO potential actions in the conflict-affected context, the reader should utilize the *Draft ILO policy statement on conflict-affected countries*, adopted in November 1997 by the ILO Interregional Seminar on Reintegration of Conflict-affected Countries. This policy statement appears in section 4.2 below. This could also be supplemented by the document *Towards a framework for ILO policy and action in the conflict-affected context* (ILO, September 1997).

4.1 General principles

160.   Conflict situations are by their nature characterized by uncertainty, and outcomes cannot always be predicted. The guiding principle of involvement by United Nations specialized agencies, other international agencies and bodies in conflict-affected countries should be flexibility in response to emergencies and requests for assistance, as well as in the mobilization of programmes and finance (OECD DAC 1997, p. 22).

161.   The large number of conflict-affected countries, some of which are members of the ILO, presents challenges to the Organization, whose role in reconstruction, conflict resolution and peace building has a long history. The ILO, unlike the other United Nations specialized agencies or multilateral institutions, combines in its formal terms of reference an economic and social mission and explicit commitment to conflict resolution. The ILO's pursuit of peaceful reconciliation of the inherent tensions between capital and labour can also be seen as a special case of conflict resolution.

162.   In a conflict-related context, one of the ILO's missions is to employ its historic relationship with its tripartite constituent members – governments, workers and employers – to "mobilize social dialogue which is indispensable for reconciliation" (ILO: *Towards a framework for ILO policy and action in the conflict-affected context*, 1997). It can also provide technical assistance to foster absorption of the conflict-affected population through a range of skills training and employment promotion programmes. Furthermore, the ILO's historic role and experience equip it well to provide assistance to governments, employers and employees' organizations to ensure their involvement and also the coverage of labour-related issues in peace negotiations, reintegration and reconstruction processes and programmes.

163.   The commitment of the ILO to peace building, reintegration and reconstruction is reflected in its Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia, 1944, and also the International Labour Recommendation No. 71 (Employment) Transition from War to Peace, 1944. The latter stresses, inter alia, that:

> "The character and magnitude of the employment adjustments required during the transition from war to peace necessitate special action, more particularly for the purpose of facilitating the re-employment of demobilized members of the armed forces, discharged war workers, and all persons whose usual employment has been interrupted as a result of war..."(p. 1)

The task of transition specified above remains valid today, though revision of Recommendation No. 71 is required in light of changed circumstances and the current nature of modern warfare.

164. In order for the ILO to play a useful role in conflict situations, it must be clear about its objectives and basic principles for action. International agencies have a responsibility to make their goals and programmes in the conflict-affected context clear and transparent. It is for this reason that the ILO, like other bodies, needs a specific policy statement on the issue as formulated by the ILO Interregional Seminar, mentioned above. All the social partners, like other relevant actors in conflict-affected countries, have a responsibility to pursue reconciliation for a lasting peace. For the social partners and other institutions of civil society (e.g. NGOs) to contribute effectively to reintegration and other efforts, they require capacity building, relevant information and guidance based, for example, upon accumulated insights from the experiences of many conflict-affected countries.

165. Successful skills training and employment programme design, planning and implementation are derivative in each country from an understanding of the roots and dynamics of conflict and reconciliation and the role of the social partners in those dynamics. To quote from an ILO report on Mozambique, planning must be based upon "an analysis of conflict and its aftermath, which looks at processes of political, social and institutional change..." (Baden, 1997, p. 81).

166. As indicated in the preceding chapters, certain aspects of the design and implementation of programmes is common to all conflict-affected countries (regardless of level of development) and must be borne in mind by the ILO and all the other relevant actors. First, the programmes should be inclusive, to avoid aggravating old tensions or creating new ones. Second, they must reflect the gender dimension of conflict, which is based upon the concrete (and diverse) experiences of women and men during conflict, rather than on an abstract conceptualization of gender and "roles of women and men". It is important that the victimization of women in the conflict context be addressed, while, at the same time, not treating women as passive victims of conflict, which tends to lead to their exclusion from mainstream training and employment schemes. Furthermore, the positive gender role changes that occur within the exigencies of armed conflict should be taken into account.

167. Many disabled youths and adults, following medical rehabilitation and the provision of technical aids (crutches, wheelchairs, etc.), can participate in general reconstruction and reintegration programmes. There is no functional reason for economic or social segregation. However, the particular needs of persons with disabilities (transportation, housing, occupational therapy, etc.) have to be identified and addressed. Central to conflict resolution is addressing the problems of particular groups in consultation with their representatives within a framework of inclusiveness, and this applies as well to disabled persons.

168. Programme guidelines which apply equally to the ILO and all the other actors – national and international – in the reintegration process are found in Chapter 3. Below are presented those guidelines which may be specific to ILO operations, focusing upon its unique institutional role.

169. Central to the effectiveness of all ILO and other operations is coordination with other actors, in country and externally. Coordination with governments requires a national commitment and framework for the reintegration process. The ILO will only be able to carry out effective programmes in conflict-affected countries if it maximizes coordination and cooperation with other international bodies, in particular with other relevant organizations of the UN system.

Timing of ILO interventions

170.   Design and planning of projects can be carried out by the ILO before conflicts have completely abated. These can be based on identified needs, ILO experience in other countries and on the information available from social partners. Subject to personal security issues and an accommodating political environment, ILO activities in conflict-affected countries should be carried out in all phases of the conflict situation and not be restricted, conceptually or practically, to post-conflict situations. Early in-country activities by the ILO can provide the lead in building a bridge between "relief" and "development" activities.

171.   The ILO must be aware, however, of some of the possible dangers in conducting programmes during conflict. It is fundamentally important that the ILO maintain neutrality in relation to conflicting groups and interests. There is too much experience of international agencies becoming involved in support programmes with "people centred" good intentions but being manipulated by a particular faction or group in the conflict, with the result that their neutrality is compromised. Where the ILO becomes involved during a conflict, it is important to preserve the institutional mechanism of tripartism in consultation, programme design, conduct of research and analysis, etc. This can help to minimize the risks of inadvertent partiality during a conflict.

172.   During the peace process, the critical role of employment promotion and labour market governance can be placed on the negotiating agenda. At as early a stage in the process as is feasible, the ILO can promote inclusion of the provisions of relevant international labour standards such as on workers' rights, observance of equality and social protection in the reintegration programmes. Examples of such international labour standards are those dealing with anti-discrimination (Convention No. 111), protection of indigenous and tribal people (Convention No. 169), prohibition of forced labour (Convention Nos. 29 & 105), freedom of association (Convention No. 87), minimum age (Convention No. 138), and the right to organize collectively (Convention No. 98). To this end, the ILO may establish a coordinating and "quick-response" team to facilitate its timely intervention during, before and after the peace negotiations.

Targeted training

173.   Training is embedded in all the specified areas of ILO action. As is already being done, the ILO could help to enhance the capacity of the diverse training providers and to promote flexible but effective skills training to reach the many vulnerable groups in the conflict-affected context. It could also assist the relevant institutions – especially the labour-related ones including the social partners, NGOs and other community-based and national bodies – to incorporate targeted training as an integral part of their employment and income-generating activities. It can help them in collecting relevant labour market information which could point them to the emerging skill demands and employment opportunities to be considered in their skills training activities. Such ILO assistance can also cover the collection of relevant information on the labour force, such as skill profiles before and after conflict.

174.   Every attempt should be made in ILO programmes for training and employment promotion to draw on local expertise and resources. The greater the local input, in personnel and material, the more likely that the programmes will be sustainable in the long term. Use of local resources requires imaginative adaptation of indigenous skills, technologies, and materials.

Employment-intensive works programmes

175.   The ILO should promote the advantages of labour-based technologies in infrastructure works programmes, stressing the need for a balance between labour absorption and the quality of infrastructure reconstruction. Much progress has been made in recent years in the design of labour-absorbing technologies (Stock & de Veer, 1996). Nonetheless, there remain prejudices against such techniques, on the belief that they are inefficient and/or generate low-quality outputs. Even before the formal end of a conflict, the ILO can play an important role in educating governments and donors on the advantages of labour-based approaches to infrastructure works. This could be part of the Organization's general advocacy role on employment's critical importance in reinte-gration, reconstruction and peace building in the conflict-affected context.

Small and micro enterprise development

176.   In addition to the extensive guidelines on small and micro enterprises in Chapter 3, it can also be observed that the ILO (as part of its cooperation with other international organizations) can stress that structural adjustment programmes (often implemented by the countries emerging from conflict as well as by others) are conceived in such a way as to create an enabling environment for small and micro-enterprise development. These programmes involve macroeconomic policies with potentially profound effects on small enterprises; yet rarely do they inves-

tigate the likely consequences. Of particular concern should be interest rate policy, because small enterprises, in contrast to large ones, raise most of their capital through in-country financial markets. Past ILO research has generated a wealth of data to inform policy makers on the relationship between small enterprises and macroeconomic conditions.

177.   Small and micro-enterprise training and also training in business identification should be intensified by the ILO for countries emerging from armed conflict. The ILO can make an important educational contribution by dispelling the false stereotype that small and micro enterprises must be low wage and low technology, producing low-quality commodities for the bottom end of the domestic market. Educating governments and donors in the dynamic potential of small enterprises, including international competitive markets, should be an ILO priority.

Monitoring the observance of relevant international labour standards

178.   In keeping with its mandate, the ILO should monitor the observance of relevant international labour standards in early-warning, reintegration, reconstruction and peace-building programmes, i.e generally in the conflict-affected context.

179.   The *Draft ILO policy statement on conflict-affected countries* which follows will provide the reader with additional information on the ILO's potential actions based, for example, on its comparative advantages, experience, standards and tripartite structure.

4.2 Draft ILO policy statement on conflict-affected countries

180. The *ILO Interregional Seminar on Reintegration of Conflict-Affected Groups through Skills Training and Employment Promotion*, convened 3-7 November 1997 within the framework of the Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Training and in accordance with the decision of the 269th Session of the ILO Governing Body, adopted the following policy statement for transmission to the ILO Governing Body for consideration. It is reproduced below, as it provides additional guidelines on ILO's role in the conflict-affected context.

"The promotion of employment, social justice, democracy and the observance of human rights and international labour standards are the primary objectives of the International Labour Organization. The ILO was established in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War, as part of the process of reconstructing the countries involved in that war and trying to ensure that the social and economic factors that contributed to the war did not reoccur. In 1944, following the Second World War, the Organization adopted the Declaration of Philadelphia as well as Recommendation No. 71 on Employment (Transition from War to Peace). Both of these documents underline the mission of the ILO to prevent war and social conflict, to support the process of reintegration and reconstruction and to build sustainable peace. Lasting peace, as the Declaration of Philadelphia asserted, can only be built on the foundation of social justice.

As we approach the dawn of the twenty-first century however, war and civil conflicts are widespread across the countries and regions of the world, although the threat of global war has receded. In 1994 alone, there were 45 open conflicts in different regions; currently about one-third of ILO member States are experiencing, emerging from, entering or re-entering conflict, or affected by conflict in a neighbouring country. Just as developments during the Second World War called for serious discussion in the International Labour Conference, the Governing Body and the Office to review the issue of post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction and the ILO's role and action in this sphere, so the current high number of conflicts around the world require an equal response. While the normal work of the Organization continues to be important in this respect, it is not sufficient to address the grave problems of conflict-affected countries.

Societies making the transition from conflict to normal social and economic development are confronted by particularly difficult challenges. These include the reintegration of demobilized combatants, the internally displaced and returning refugees, and other groups in society affected by the conflict; the reconstruction of the labour market infrastructure within a framework of a broader economic strategy; rebuilding of institutional capacity and the skills reservoir of the country; the support of broader aspects of the peace process; the establishment or re-establishment of information systems; and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. Institutions are typically weakened by conflicts, and prior weakness may be a contributing cause of conflict. As a result, the ILO should place a high priority on assistance in capacity building, particularly of labour and social affairs ministries, workers' and employers' organizations, other labour market institutions and authorities responsible for resettlement and rehabilitation.

During conflict, it is important for the ILO to provide a voice to and support for the social partners to actively participate in dialogue and negotiations concerning peace and in planning for reconstruction. Analysis of the conflict or war economy and work and employment issues that are weakening or sustaining the drive towards peace could make an important contribution to this. The ILO should also assist its tripartite constituents in contributing to reconciliation efforts and peace negotiations by underlining the importance of international labour standards, employment and labour issues, as well as enhanc-

ing their capacity to play an active role in these processes. During conflict, it should also contribute to the rehabilitation and reintegration of conflict-affected groups – such as ex-combatants, women, disabled people and youth – and, through employment promotion and planning, build towards sustainable peace, recreation of the social fabric, rehabilitation of the infrastructure and revival of the economy.

Special attention is also required to anticipate and draw attention to economic and social trends – such as poverty and unemployment, the break down of social dialogue and the abuse of human rights – that contribute to conflict and undermine social order. The ILO should contribute to early-warning indicators of conflict through its supervisory mechanisms which monitor the observance of international labour standards, including violations of freedom of association and the principle of non-discrimination. It should additionally monitor national labour market trends, social exclusion, poverty and the adverse consequences of social and economic policies, which contribute to the occurrence of conflict. Through its tripartite structure, it is in a position to promote social dialogue which has the potential to defuse or decrease tensions.

The scope and diversity of the problems faced by conflict-affected countries require that the ILO coordinate its activities with all in-country and external actors, including other organizations and specialized agencies of the UN system, to ensure linkages between the different contributions and in order to enhance their respective and combined impact. This implies a flexible and inclusive approach which, while being sensitive to the particular needs of the most vulnerable, integrates all relevant groups into a broader process concerned with a collective response to the needs of the whole society. This in turn requires that the ILO adopts a participatory approach aimed at attaining consensus on the design and implementation of programmes both at the national, local and community levels. Participation should be seen as the vehicle for national and local ownership to ensure that programmes are sustainable and user-driven. It also constitutes an important tool in the

general process of building national reconciliation.

It is important that the ILO makes clear what assistance it can deliver and the way in which such assistance can be delivered. This should preclude the development of a gap between what is expected and what can be achieved. Areas in which the ILO has a particular contribution to make include: social and labour policy formulation and their inclusion in peace accords; local and national institutional capacity building, especially in the fields of labour market policies, programmes and administration; the creation of an enabling legislative framework in the fields of labour law, labour relations and international labour standards; training, particularly vocational training, including life skills, linked to emerging employment opportunities; promotion of women's employment; rehabilitation of disabled persons; employment creation through enterprise development, productive self-employment, and employment-intensive works; social protection and social services; and labour market research, information and needs assessment.

In formulating its programmes of assistance, the ILO will need to take account of the origins, dynamics and outcome of a given conflict. For example, situations of exclusion that contribute to conflicts may not have disappeared with the end of the conflict, while others may have appeared as a result of the conflict. Programmes should respond to the manner in which the conflict has affected the society and the varied characteristics, complexity and dynamics of the conflict-affected countries themselves. The ILO's usual responses and approaches require adaptation to enhance their relevance and impact in specific contexts. This calls for flexibility in the Organization's usual modes of operation. The Organization should therefore allocate its own human and financial resources in ways which are appropriate for dealing with the particular problems of conflict-affected countries. It also needs a special programme to mobilize resources of the donor community to maximize technical assistance to these countries and also to draw attention to the unique contribution that labour and social

policy and interventions can make towards reducing their plight.

In order to provide a framework for ILO action, it might also be appropriate to review the international labour standards relevant to conflict-affected countries (particularly Recommendations Nos. 68, 71, 72 and 73,[3] which were all adopted in 1944) and assess the need for revision, so that they can provide guidance relevant to present-day conflicts. Emphasis should also be placed on the core human rights Conventions of the ILO, especially Convention No. 111 which has an important role to play in preventing discrimination before, during and after the conflict, as well as other relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations.

This statement is intended to underline the Organization's commitment to addressing the needs of countries affected by conflict and, in line with its mandate, to working with member States in all regions of the world to create the conditions for sustainable peace and equitable economic and social development."

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[3] Recommendation No. 68: Social Security (Armed Forces); Recommendation No. 71: Employment (Transition from War to Peace); Recommendation No. 72: Employment Service; and Recommendation No. 73: Public Works (National Planning), 1944.

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